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DecriMiNaLiZiNG STUDeNTS wiTh DiSaBiLiTieS
A man should be able to find an education by taking the broad highway. 
He should not have to take by-roads through the woods and follow 
winding trails through sharp thickets, in constant tension because of the 
pitfalls and traps, and, after years of effort, perhaps attain the threshold 
of his goal when he is past caring about it.1
i. intrOdUCtiOn
 The criminalization of students for school-related misconduct has burgeoned 
into a major national issue.2 The issue embodies serious questions about crime and 
punishment, discipline and fairness, disability and difference, and educational 
adequacy and dysfunction. This article centers on what started as an ordinary case of 
special education—named Chris L.3—that transformed into a national cause.4 The 
case focused on the legal limitations that govern school systems when they seek to 
prosecute students with disabilities in juvenile court for school misconduct. Now is a 
propitious time to revisit the Chris L. case.
1. Draper v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. System, 518 F.3d 1275, 1279–80 (11th Cir. 2008) (special education case) 
(quoting Meredith v. Fair, 298 F.2d 696, 703 (5th Cir. 1962) (invalidating Mississippi’s white-only 
admissions policy)).
2. See, e.g., Advancement Project, Mapping and Analyzing the Schoolhouse to Jailhouse Track: 
An Action Kit for Understanding How Harsh School Discipline Policies and Practices are 
Impacting Your Community (2009); Children’s Def. Fund, America’s Cradle To Prison Pipeline 
(2007), available at http://www.childrensdefense.org/child-research-data-publications/data/cradle-prison-
pipeline-report-2007-full-lowres.pdf; Deconstructing the School-to-Prison Pipeline: New 
Directions for Youth Development (Johanna Wald & Daniel J. Losen eds., 2003); Elora 
Mukherjee, NYCLU & ACLU, Criminalizing the Classroom: The Over-Policing of New York 
City Schools (2007), available at http://www.nyclu.org/pdfs/criminalizing_the_classroom_report.pdf; 
NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Dismantling the School-To-Prison-Pipeline (2006), 
available at http://www.naacpldf.org/content/pdf/pipeline/Dismantling_the_School_to_Prison_Pipeline.
pdf; NYCLU, Annenberg Inst. For Sch. Reform & Make The Road New York, Safety With 
Dignity: Alternatives to the Over-Policing of Schools (2009), available at http://www.
annenberginstitute.org/pdf/Safety_Report.pdf; Elizabeth Sullivan & Elizabeth Keeney, Nat’l 
Econ. & Soc. Rights Initiative, Teachers Talk: School Culture, Safety and Human Rights 
21–29 (2008), available at http://www.nesri.org/Teachers_Talk.pdf; Monique L. Dixon, Combating the 
Schoolhouse-to-Jailhouse Track Through Community Lawyering, 39 Clearinghouse Rev. 135 (2005); 
ACLU, Talking Points: The School-To-Prison-Pipeline (June 6, 2008), http://www.aclu.org/racial-justice/
school-prison-pipeline-talking-points (last visited Mar. 3, 2010); Southern Poverty Law Center, School-
To-Prison-Pipeline: Stopping the School-To-Prison Pipeline By Enforcing Special Education Law, http://www.
splcenter.org/legal/schoolhouse.jsp (last visited Mar. 3, 2010). In Safford Unified Sch. Dist. # 1 v. Redding, 
Justice Thomas, who has urged a drastic hands-off approach by courts in school matters, cited instances of 
criminalization of students as a result of school policies that he termed controversial. 129 U.S. 2633, 
2646–58 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
3. Morgan v. Chris L., 927 F. Supp. 267 (E.D. Tenn. 1994), aff ’d, 106 F.3d 401 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. 
denied, 520 U.S. 1271 (1997).
4. For an incisive analysis of the ethics of everyday practice, see David B. Wilkins, Everyday Practice Is the 
Troubling Case: Confronting Context in Legal Ethics, in Everyday Practices and Trouble Cases 68 
(Austin Sarat et al. eds., 1998).
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 Chris L. stands as an important historical guidepost to the current efforts to 
derail the “school-to-prison pipeline,”5 both for students with disabilities and for all 
students at risk of educational distress. Chris L. was a middle school student who 
was diagnosed by his doctor as having Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder 
(“AD/HD”).6 He was struggling in school, both academically and behaviorally.7 
Despite knowledge of Chris’s problems, his school system did not evaluate him for 
possible certification under special education laws.8 He was involved in an incident in 
a school bathroom, where he was accused of kicking a pipe and causing water 
damage.9 The school system promptly filed a juvenile court petition against Chris for 
criminal vandalism.10 Years of successful litigation ensued. The vivid facts of the 
Chris L. case and its nonpunitive, child-centered judicial opinions make this case a 
gateway for understanding and potentially stemming the over-criminalization of 
students. Today, the over-criminalization and push-out of students by schools is 
viewed by many as counterproductive to sound educational practice and inimical to 
the human and civil rights of students.11 In such an environment, the lessons of Chris 
L. readily can be universalized to all students enmeshed in the pipeline, regardless of 
their disability status.
 This article will first chronicle the evolution of methods of school exclusion 
under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). Next, an in-depth 
account of the Chris L. case will disclose the manifold tensions that arise when IDEA 
rights are asserted to defend against a central tactic of school exclusion—
criminalization of students with disabilities for behaviors that are a manifestation of 
their disorders. The article will then review the effect of the compromise language 
adopted in the 1997 reauthorization of the IDEA, followed by an analysis of the 
conf licting attitudes and inconsistent court decisions left in the reauthorization’s 
wake. Next, an analysis of the governing IDEA rules and the problems inherent in 
their deployment to stem the use of criminalization by schools will be discussed. 
This article will conclude with a call for reform, encouraging usage of the Chris L. 
case as the path for courts and legislatures to follow.
5. The school-to-prison pipeline refers to systemic policies and practices that push our nation’s 
schoolchildren, especially at-risk children, out of classrooms and into the juvenile and criminal justice 
systems. It ref lects a prioritization of incarceration over education, particularly for children of color. See 
New York Civil Liberties Union, Racial Justice, http://www.nyclu.org/issues/racial-justice/school-
prison-pipeline (last visited Mar. 3, 2010).
6. Chris L., 927 F. Supp. at 268.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 269.
10. Id.
11. See Dean Hill Rivkin, Legal Advocacy and Education Reform: Litigating School Exclusion, 75 Tenn. L. 
Rev. 265 (2008).
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ii.  spECiaL EdUCatiOn: LEgaLiZatiOn and rEsistanCE
 Chris L. was a salient special education case. It involved issues of conduct and 
misconduct that have been perennially divisive in school systems across the country. 
As Chris L. shows, a host of inequalities pervade the field of special education. A 
concise discussion of the history of the IDEA provides the necessary context for a 
re-examination of the Chris L. litigation and this article’s argument for its universal 
application to all students.
 A. Legalization: Protecting Rights
 Congress enacted the IDEA in 1975.12 In its findings, Congress noted that 
“millions of children with disabilities . . . [are] excluded entirely from the public 
school system and [do not go through the educational process] with their peers.”13 To 
redress this problem, the IDEA sought to “ensure that all children with disabilities 
have available to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special 
education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them 
for further education, employment and independent living.”14 To achieve this goal, 
Congress conferred a panoply of rights on children with disabilities and their parents 
to aid them in their disputes with school systems.15
 The scheme that Congress enacted to promote these ends and to protect the 
educational rights of children with disabilities rested on a dense thicket of procedural 
protections.16 This scheme was designed to ensure that the parents of students with 
disabilities have enforceable opportunities to participate in all aspects of educational 
decision making for their child.17 The aptly named “due process hearing” was the 
centerpiece for resolving special education disputes. Such hearings were constructed 
to curtail the previously virtually unfettered discretion enjoyed by school 
administrators in educating (or failing to educate) students with disabilities.18 
Accordingly, the IDEA was a crowning achievement of legal liberalism.
 Significant scholarly critiques of the regime of rights embodied in the IDEA 
soon emerged. David Neal and David Kirp posited that the rights-based IDEA 
12. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2006).
13. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2)(B).
14. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A).
15. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(B).
16. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (2006).
17. See Donna L. Terman et al., Special Education for Students with Disabilities: Analysis and Recommendations, 
6 The Future of Child. 1, 4, 15 (1996), available at http://futureofchildren.org/futureofchildren/
publications/docs/06_01_FullJournal.pdf.
18. In enacting IDEA, Congress sought to redress the abuses of uncabined discretion epitomized in 
Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), and Mills v. Board of Education of the 
District of Columbia, 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
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safeguards impeded cooperative decision-making between parents and schools.19 Joel 
Handler emphasized the weaknesses inherent in the due process model for parents 
who have little sophistication in educational advocacy and/or little access to legal 
representation.20 Martha Minow analyzed the contradictory goals embedded within 
the IDEA and critiqued the “partial approach of litigation” in cases involving 
“different” people.21
 In light of the critiques of the IDEA’s efficacy, it is no small irony that parents 
who have been able to enforce their children’s rights in court have fared exceptionally 
well on traditional criteria.22 Since 1983, the United States Supreme Court has 
decided eleven IDEA cases involving individual disputes between children and their 
schools.23 In nine of these cases, the Court substantially upheld claims that the school 
system was not providing adequate services or protections to children with 
disabilities.24 In these cases, the Court displayed great deference both to the expansive 
remedial intentions of Congress and to the choices made by parents seeking to secure 
educational and treatment services for their children.25 Notably, the Court was 
distinctly unsympathetic to arguments made by school systems that either the lack of 
19. David Neal & David L. Kirp, The Allure of Legalization Reconsidered: The Case of Special Education, 48 
Law & Contemp. Probs. 63, 79 (1985).
20. Joel F. Handler, The Conditions of Discretion, Autonomy, Community, Bureaucracy 79 
(1986).
21. Martha Minow, Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion, and American Law 
35–39, 350–72 (2nd prtg. 1991). In special education, parents often focus on relationships rather than 
rights. David M. Engel, Essay: Law, Culture, and Children with Disabilities: Educational Rights and the 
Construction of Difference, 1991 Duke L.J. 166, 199 (1991).
22. Attorneys for school systems view the process of litigation under the IDEA as overly cumbersome, 
dominated by sophisticated parents and their experienced counsel, and in need of major reform. Kevin 
J. Lanigan et al., Nasty, Brutish . . . and Often Not Very Short: The Attorney Perspective on Due Process, in 
Rethinking Special Education for a New Century 213, 225–28 (Chester E. Finn, Jr. et al. eds., 
2001). But see President’s Comm’n on Excellence in Special Educ., A New Era: Revitalizing 
Special Education for Children and Their Families (2002), available at http://www2.ed.gov/
inits/commissionsboards/whspecialeducation/reports/images/Pres_Rep.pdf. Parents of children with 
special education needs “often do not feel they are empowered when the system fails them.” Id. at 8.
23. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 129 U.S. 2484 (2009); Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City 
Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516 (2007); Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291 
(2006); Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49 (2005); Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Garret 
F. ex rel. Charlene F., 526 U.S. 66 (1999); Florence County Sch. Dist. v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 (1993); 
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993); Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988); Sch. 
Comm. of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359 (1985); Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 
883 (1984); Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
24. These cases include: Forest Grove Sch. Dist., 129 U.S. 2484; Winkelman, 550 U.S. 516; Schaffer, 546 U.S. 
49; Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist., 526 U.S. 66; Florence County Sch. Dist, 510 U.S. 7; Zobrest, 509 U.S. 
1; Honig, 484 U.S. 305; Sch. Comm. of Burlington, 471 U.S. 359; Irving Indep. Sch. Dist., 468 U.S. 883.
25. See Forest Grove Sch. Dist., 129 U.S. at 2491–96; Winkelman, 550 U.S. at 523–35; Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 
52–62; Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist., 526 U.S. at 73–78; Florence County Sch. Dist, 510 U.S. at 12–15; 
Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 10; Honig, 484 U.S. at 309–12; Sch. Comm. of Burlington, 471 U.S. at 367–68; Irving 
Indep. Sch. Dist., 468 U.S. at 891–93.
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available resources or traditional educational considerations limited their ability to 
fulfill the obligations imposed by the IDEA.26
 B. Resistance: Disciplinary Exclusion
 From its enactment, school systems resisted—mostly in low visibility ways—the 
restraints placed on their autonomy by the IDEA.27 The exclusion of behaviorally 
problematic students from school has been a long-standing phenomenon in school 
systems.28 This history of exclusion precipitated the enactment of the IDEA in 1975. 
One of two foundational cases cited in the legislative history of the IDEA, Mills v. 
Board of Education of the District of Columbia provided relief on equal protection 
grounds to seven “exceptional” children with behavioral disorders who challenged 
their exclusion from the public schools of the District of Columbia.29 These students, 
who were deemed to have behavior problems, suffered from mental retardation, 
emotional disturbance, or hyperactivity.30 They ranged in age from eight to sixteen.31 
Pleading lack of funding from Congress, the school system argued that diverting 
more money to special education would be “inequitable” to those students who did 
not qualify for such special education services.32
 Mills, and a similar case from Pennsylvania on behalf of mentally retarded children 
who were also excluded from school because of their challenging behaviors,33 led to the 
zero-reject principle embodied in the IDEA.34 In enacting the IDEA, Congress 
specifically targeted students with mental or emotional disabilities for assistance.35 
Such assistance included a plan of individualized instruction (the “individualized 
education plan” or “IEP”) as well as support services designed to benefit the student’s 
learning and behavior at school.36 The IDEA also specified a regime of procedural 
26. The most recent example is the Forest Grove case, where the Court, over strong fiscal arguments by 
school systems, rejected claims that Congress intended that parents place a child in an inappropriate 
public school setting before seeking reimbursement for a private placement. Forest Grove Sch. Dist., 129 
U.S. at 2487.
27. The grand intentions of educators that IDEA would lead to individualized learning plans for all students 
were short-lived. See Richard A. Weatherley & Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucrats and Institutional 
Innovation: Instituting Special Education Reform, 47 Harv. Educ. Rev. 176, 196 (1977).
28. See Mitchell L. Yell, David Rogers & Elisabeth Lodge Rogers, The Legal History of Special Education: 
What a Long, Strange Trip It’s Been!, 19 Remedial & Special Educ. 219 (1998).
29. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
30. Id. at 868.
31. Id. at 869–70.
32. Id. at 875.
33. P.A. Ass’n for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
34. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d) (2006).
35. The IDEA legislative history revealed that the needs of children with emotional disabilities were 
substantially unmet. See Honig, 484 U.S. at 309 (citing S. Rep. No. 94-168 (1975)).
36. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)–(7) (2006).
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safeguards—including notice and an opportunity to contest proposed alterations in a 
disabled student’s educational program—to ensure meaningful parental participation 
in the special education process.37 These “procedural safeguards” tangibly limited the 
formerly unchecked discretion that school systems exercised over removal of special 
education students who misbehaved.
 Thirteen years after the enactment of the IDEA, the United States Supreme Court 
confronted claims by a California school system that the IDEA hamstrung its efforts 
to deal with students whose disruptive and violent behaviors created risks of harm to 
themselves, their classmates, and their teachers. In Honig v. Doe, the San Francisco 
Unified School District sought to expel indefinitely two emotionally disturbed students 
for engaging in dangerous conduct at school.38 John Doe, one of the students involved 
in this case, assaulted another student at the developmental center attended by both 
students.39 Doe had been the target of teasing and ridicule by his peers, and his IEP 
sought to assist him when he confronted such frustrating situations.40 Challenging his 
exclusion as a violation of the IDEA, the district court ordered the school district to 
return Doe to his school following twenty-four school days of expulsion.41
 The San Francisco school system also sought to expel Jack Smith, a student they 
identified as emotionally disturbed.42 Smith showed a propensity for verbal hostility 
and physical aggression.43 He suffered from extreme hyperactivity and low self-
esteem.44 He was impulsive, anxious, and easily distracted.45 His behavior at school 
included stealing, extorting money from fellow students, and making sexual 
comments to female classmates.46 When Smith’s behaviors persisted, the school 
system sought his expulsion.47 He received home instruction until he re-entered 
school by order of the district court.48
37. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a)–(j) (2006).
38. 484 U.S. at 312.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 312–13. As recounted in the Court’s majority decision:
 On November 6, 1980, Doe responded to the taunts of a fellow student in precisely the 
explosive manner anticipated by his IEP: he choked the student with sufficient force to 
leave abrasions on the child’s neck, and kicked out a school window while being escorted 
to the principal’s office afterwards. Doe admitted his misconduct and the school 
subsequently suspended him for five days.
 Id. at 313.
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 Justice Brennan’s majority opinion in Honig first recounted the clear congressional 
intent in enacting the IDEA to require school systems that receive IDEA funding, 
to serve even the most difficult students.49 Recounting the history of exclusion from 
schools faced by students with mental and emotional disabilities—the literal 
“warehousing” of students in separate schools or classes and the system’s neglect of 
students until they dropped out of school—the decision emphasized the complex 
scheme of procedural safeguards designed to ensure that students with disabilities be 
“mainstreamed,” not segregated, to the maximum extent appropriate.50 Justice 
Brennan also highlighted the critical role that Congress intended parents to play in 
formulating their child’s educational program.51 This collaborative process was a vast 
departure from the status quo, where school systems enjoyed considerable discretion 
to exclude disabled students from school, often indefinitely. The IDEA, as a rights-
based scheme, consequently ushered in a new era where each student was guaranteed 
an opportunity to remain in school.
 Citing the “unequivocal” language of section 1415(e)(3) of the IDEA, which 
prescribed that during the IDEA review process, students are entitled to “stay-put” 
in their then current educational placement, the Supreme Court52 rejected the urging 
of the school systems to read a “dangerousness” exception into the stay-put provision 
of the IDEA.53 The schools argued that Congress did not include such an exception 
either because it was too “obvious for comment” or because Congress inadvertently 
omitted this authority—an oversight that the Court should correct.54 Citing Mills as 
a major source of guidance for Congress, Justice Brennan surveyed the IDEA to 
demonstrate Congress’s insistence that students with emotional disabilities be 
educated regardless of their difficult and disruptive behaviors:
We think it clear, however, that Congress very much meant to strip school 
systems of the unilateral authority they had traditionally employed to exclude 
disabled students, particularly emotionally disturbed students, from school. 
In so doing, Congress did not leave school administrators powerless to deal 
with dangerous students; it did, however, deny school officials their former 
right to “self-help,” and directed that in the future the removal of disabled 
students could be accomplished only with the permission of the parents or, as 
a last resort, the courts.55
Justice Brennan also detailed the various educational methods, and administrative 
and judicial routes, that school systems can pursue to deal with the problem of 
49. Id. at 309–12.
50. Id. 
51. Id. at 311–12.
52. Id. at 323. Justice Scalia and Justice O’Connor dissented on mootness grounds. Id. at 332 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting).
53. Id. at 323.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 323–24.
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dangerous behavior.56 Accordingly, the plea by the schools to be accorded more 
discretion was soundly rebuffed.
 By the 1990s, school systems began engaging in a second wave of disciplinary 
exclusion. Seeking relief from the responsibilities of continuing to educate students 
with disabilities even after they were expelled for misconduct, the school systems 
devised three strategies. One was to deny IDEA eligibility to students with mental 
and emotional disabilities and pursue expulsion on the same basis as students in what 
is called “regular education.”57 A second strategy was to continue educational services, 
but in a segregated setting.58 The third strategy (and the focus of this article) was to 
prosecute students with disabilities by filing juvenile court petitions.59 The Chris L. 
case challenged the third practice.
iii.  Chris L. v. Knox County sChooLs: an arrEsting CasE Of spECiaL 
EdUCatiOn
 A. A Child’s History
 On May 11, 1993, Chris L., a fourteen-year-old eighth grader at Northwest 
Middle School in Knoxville Tennessee, allegedly kicked and broke a pipe in a school 
bathroom.60 The principal estimated that water from the ruptured pipe caused 
approximately $800 in damage.61 At the time of the incident, Chris was in the 
bathroom with another boy.62 Both were eighth graders and were not authorized to 
be in this bathroom, which was reserved for sixth graders.63 Following the incident, 
the principal called Chris’s mother to pick him up. When she arrived, she was told 
that Chris would be suspended for three days.64 She was directed to attend a 
“disciplinary” meeting on May 17th.65
 The next day, the school system, through a security officer, filed a petition 
against both boys in the local juvenile court. The petition stated:
56. Id. at 325–27.
57. See Mark Kelman & Gillian Lester, Jumping the Queue: An Inquiry into the Legal 
Treatment of Students with Learning Disabilities 109–10 (1997).
58. Daniel J. Losen & Kevin G. Wellner, Disabling Discrimination in Our Public Schools: Comprehensive 
Legal Challenges to Inappropriate and Inadequate Special Education Services for Minority Children, 36 Harv. 
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 407, 407–08 (2001).
59. See Chris L., 927 F. Supp. at 267.
60. Due Process Hearing Final Order at 1, In re Chris L., No. 93-19 (Tenn. Dep’t of Educ. July 28, 1993) 
[hereinafter Due Process Hearing Final Order] (on file with author).
61. Id. at 8.
62. Id. at 5.
63. Transcript of Proceedings at 149, Chris L. v. Knox County Sch. System, (Tenn. Dep’t of Educ. May 12, 
1993) [hereinafter Due Process Hearing Transcript] (on file with author).
64. Due Process Hearing Final Order, supra note 60, at 5.
65. Id.
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Petitioner avers that said child is delinquent or unruly and in need of treatment 
or rehabilitation, or dependent and neglected within the meaning of the law 
of the State of Tennessee in that said child did on May 11, 1993, commit the 
offense of vandalism, in that said child, along with Jonathan [W.], did kick 
and burst a main water line pipe in a bathroom at Northwest Middle School 
in Knox County, Tenn.66
The L. family did not learn of the filing of the petition until the May 17th meeting.
 As with many similar cases, Chris L. did not begin with the filing of the juvenile 
court petition. A sensible starting point would be 1986, when Chris’s father, Mike 
L., first became concerned about Chris’s progress in school.67 By the time that Chris 
was in the fourth grade, he was receiving Ds in his coursework and, according to his 
father, “[h]is conduct was very unsatisfactory.”68 This pattern continued in the fifth 
grade. At the initiation of school personnel, a school psychologist tested Chris to 
determine if he was eligible for services under the federal special education laws.69 
Although he was deemed ineligible, the school set up a contract system to assist 
Chris with his grades and his behavior.70 His parents were an integral part of this 
system. Under this plan, Chris’s behavior and schoolwork improved slightly.71
 In the fall of 1990, Chris began sixth grade at Northwest Middle School. His 
grades were Ds and Fs, and his behavior was no better.72 At some sacrifice, Chris’s 
parents enrolled him in a program at the Sylvan Learning Center, where, with 
individualized attention, he appeared to make small strides in several of his subjects.73 
Nevertheless, Chris “failed” the sixth grade and was told that he would have to 
repeat it.74 Yet, when he returned the next school year, Chris was inexplicably placed 
in the seventh grade.75 His grades remained low and his behavior was a concern for 
the entire school year. At one point, the principal sought permission from Chris’s 
parents to paddle him when he misbehaved.76 They refused to give their 
permission.77
66. Petition at 1, In re Chris L. (Knox County, Tenn. Juvenile Court May 12, 1993) (on file with author).
67. Due Process Hearing Transcript, supra note 63, at 99.
68. Id. at 100.
69. Id. at 101–02.
70. Id. at 102.
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. at 103–08.
74. Id. at 111–12.
75. Id. at 113.
76. Id. at 114.
77. Id. 
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 In the late spring of 1992, Chris’s parents met with the school psychologist, a 
school counselor, and the principal.78 The school psychologist reported that Chris’s 
teachers unanimously had identified a set of problematic characteristics including “hard 
to follow instructions, fails to finish, short attention span, frequent activity shifts, 
excessive talking, often does not listen, [and] often loses things.”79 Chris was identified 
as impulsive—someone who “acts before thinking.”80 The school psychologist suggested 
that Chris likely suffered from AD/HD and recommended that Chris be tested by his 
doctor.81 Within a week, Chris’s pediatrician had diagnosed him with this disorder and 
prescribed the medication Ritalin.82 Mike L. hand-delivered a letter to the principal 
explaining the diagnosis and the need to administer the medication during school.83
 Despite the diagnosis and medication, Chris did not fare any better when he 
returned for the 1992–93 school year, Chris’s final year at Northwest Middle School. 
By mid-year, Chris’s school performance and behavior had deteriorated further. His 
grades were all Ds and Fs, and he was in a cycle of misbehavior that worsened as 
time went on.84
 In early February, Chris was suspended from school, first for three, and then for 
two days.85 When Chris returned, the assistant principal told Chris’s father that he had 
instructions from the principal to suspend Chris for the rest of the school year.86 Mike 
L. pleaded with the assistant principal, telling him that Chris was scheduled to see his 
pediatrician to adjust his medication.87 Chris won a reprieve, and at Mike L.’s insistent 
urgings, the school initiated its own evaluation pursuant to the IDEA.88
 Despite the on-going evaluation, Chris received no interventions—such as a 
behavior management plan—from the school. In fact, during this time period, Chris 
received thirty-three “demerits,” was suspended for five days out of school (making a 
total of twelve for the school year), and received eight days of in-school suspension.89 
Before imposition of these disciplinary actions, the school did not consult with 
78. Id.
79. Id. at 117.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 118.
82. Id. at 118–20, 122.
83. Id. at 119–20.
84. Id. at 121–26. Chris L.’s disciplinary record revealed the following infractions: throwing pencils, 
refusing to do work, throwing a watch, refusing to sit in a seat, horse-playing, clowning in class, being 
late to class, talking out, not doing work, being out of place (in hallway without permission), refusing to 
abide by “civil rules of behavior,” refusing to sit down, being too talkative, refusing to do work, wandering 
off, causing an unruly scene, arguing with a teacher in class, and throwing airplanes in class. Id.
85. Due Process Hearing Transcript, supra note 63, at 127–28, 132.
86. Id. at 128.
87. Id. at 128–29.
88. Id. at 129, 140.
89. Id. at 135–36.
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Chris’s parents or conduct a manifestation hearing to determine the relationship 
between Chris’s behaviors and his AD/HD.90 Instead, the school counselor suggested 
that Mike L. seek private counseling for Chris. Using his private health insurance, 
Mike L. arranged for Chris to see a local psychologist with expertise in AD/HD.91
 By May 11, 1993, the date of the incident in the bathroom, the school had not 
informed the family that the IDEA evaluation was complete.92 No M-team meeting 
had been scheduled to consider Chris’s eligibility under the IDEA.93 Instead, when 
the L. family arrived for the meeting on May 17th, they were informed that the 
session would constitute an M-team meeting, in addition to a meeting to consider 
discipline for Chris.94 Those present at the meeting included the school principal, 
the school psychologist, a counselor, and a teacher.95 Preliminarily, the group agreed 
that Chris was to be certified as having AD/HD, and thus eligible for IDEA 
certification under the category of “Other Health Impairment,” the catch-all category 
for students whose disabilities did not fit into IDEA’s other, more specific categories.96 
Following this determination, the principal recommended suspending Chris for the 
rest of the school year.97 When Mike L. objected, the school psychologist suggested 
that, instead of suspension, Chris be placed in a separate “resource” class for the rest 
of the year.98 No recommendation on discipline emerged.
 Next, the M-team considered whether Chris’s action in the bathroom was a 
manifestation of his disability. Although no formal decision was made, there was 
sentiment expressed that a manifestation existed.99 The principal then called Chris 
into the room to inquire why he had been in the sixth grade bathroom.100 As one of 
the smallest boys in the eighth grade, Chris explained that boys picked on him when 
he was in the eighth grade bathroom.101 The principal lamented that Chris had not 
told him of this problem so that he could rectify it.102 The meeting concluded with 
no discussion of the juvenile court petition that had been filed.
90. Id. at 136.
91. Id. at 137–38.
92. Id. at 140–42.
93. In Tennessee at the time, an M-team was a “Multidisciplinary Team” meeting. These meetings are now 
called Individualized Education Program Team (IEP Team) meetings under the IDEA. See 34 C.F.R. 
§ 300.321 (2007). States differ in their terminology for these legally compelled gatherings of 
administrators, teachers, experts, and parents (and the child, at the discretion of the parents).
94. Due Process Hearing Transcript, supra note 63, at 142–44.
95. Id. at 143–44. 
96. Id. at 145; see also 20 U.S.C. § 140(3)(A)(i) (2006) (the IDEA “catch-all” category).
97. Due Process Hearing Transcript, supra note 63, at 146.
98. Id. at 146–48.
99. Id. at 148–49.
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 Several days later, following a conversation with the father of the other boy in the 
bathroom, Mike L. called the principal and made him an offer.103 He said that the 
two families would split the $800 in damage that was caused in the bathroom.104 
The principal was receptive and replied that he would “see what he could do.”105 
However, he called back later that day and told Mike L. that he could not drop the 
juvenile court charges, stating that it was “out of his hands.”106
 B. Seeking Redress
 Mike L. was incensed that the school had neglected Chris for as long as it did. 
He attributed much of Chris’s misbehavior to the school’s failure to address Chris’s 
AD/HD.107 He also expressed genuine frustration that the principal did not accept 
what he considered to be a fair offer to compensate the school in exchange for the 
dismissal of the Knox County Juvenile Court charge.108 He did not want Chris to 
have anything to do with the juvenile court system because he believed that it was 
unresponsive, uncaring, and punitive.109 This belief was confirmed by his initial 
unsatisfactory meeting with a juvenile court staff worker, who refused to drop the 
petition despite the progress that was made at the May 17th meeting.110
 A trial in the juvenile court was scheduled for early July.111 Mike L. rejected the 
option of appearing in the juvenile court to seek dismissal of the charges. He was 
concerned that if the case was not dismissed, and probation was ordered (a likely 
outcome in the juvenile court), Chris would face conditions of probation that would 
pro forma carry a stipulation that the child exhibit good behavior in school.112 If this 
condition was violated, violation of probation proceedings could be instituted, with 
potentially serious consequences.113 Thus, Mike L. concluded that commencing due 
process litigation was the preferable route of recourse.114
103. Id. at 153–54.
104. Id. at 155. Neither boy confessed to having kicked the pipe. Instead, they pointed the finger at each 
other. Id. at 154.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 154–55.
107. See id. at 144–46.
108. See id. at 155.
109. See id. at 151–52.
110. See id.
111. Id. at 156. Mike L. also complained about having to pay for the services of the Sylvan Learning Center 
and the clinical psychologist. Additionally, he wanted Chris’s school disciplinary record expunged. See 
id. at 155–57.
112. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 37-1-131(2)(A), (a)(2)(B)(iii) (2009).
113. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-131-132 (2009).
114. Mike L. was “shocked” that the juvenile court petition could not be dismissed by the school system. 
Due Process Hearing Transcript, supra note 63, at 153. The principal told Mike L. that it was “out of 
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 C. Due Process
 The decision to file for a due process hearing under the IDEA was settled.115 On 
June 4, 1993, a due process request letter was sent to the school superintendent 
specifying the grounds for a hearing and the relief requested.116 This triggered the 
appointment of an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) from the panel of private 
attorneys maintained by the State Department of Education.
 The only two witnesses for the L. family were Dr. Lance Laurence, Chris’s 
treating psychologist, and Mike L. Chris himself would not testify. The theory of 
the case was straightforward—Mike L. was entitled to reimbursement for the 
expenses he incurred since the school system had failed to evaluate and certify Chris 
in a timely fashion as required by the IDEA regulations.117 Regarding the juvenile 
court petition, the L. family argued that the IDEA requires a manifestation hearing 
prior to filing a juvenile court petition because such a petition caused a change of 
placement.118
 The underlying theory of the case was unambiguous. The school should be held 
accountable for its neglect of Chris’s academic and behavioral needs.119 The episode 
in the bathroom was fueled by this neglect.120 The filing of the juvenile court petition 
served no educational purpose and conflicted with settled case law in Tennessee.121 
The school system, accordingly, should be ordered to withdraw its petition.
our hands.” Id. at 154. By filing this case, he did not want to see the school system be able to shirk its 
responsibilities by “dumping” children with behavioral problems into juvenile court. See id. at 155.
115. Mike L. took comfort in the forty-five-day timeframe prescribed by the U.S. Department of Education 
for deciding due process cases and insisted that it be adhered to. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.510 (2010). 
Additionally, he was swayed by the prospect of recovering his out-of-pocket costs for psychological 
treatment and tutoring should he prevail in the hearing. See Due Process Hearing Transcript, supra note 
63, at 25, 155–57.
116. Brief for Defendants at 2, Morgan v. Chris L., 927 F. Supp. 267 (E.D. Tenn. 1994) (No. 3-93-cv-524) 
[hereinafter District Court Brief for Defendants] (on file with author).
117. Due Process Hearing Transcript, supra note 63, at 25–26.
118. The IDEA now requires a manifestation determination if a student with a disability has been determined 
to have committed an offense that violates a school rule or the school code of conduct that could result 
in exclusion from school for over ten days. The hearing must be held within the first ten days of the 
removal. See 20 U.S.C. §1415(k)(1)(E) (2006). This provision serves as another check on the discretion 
of school officials to exclude students with disabilities from their current educational program for 
disability-related conduct. See generally Shawna L. Parks & Maronel Barajas, School Discipline and Special 
Education, 41 Clearinghouse Rev. 337 (2007). Prior to the due process hearing, the school system’s 
attorney from the Knox County Law Director’s Office said that the system would likely settle the 
claims for reimbursement, and, with Dr. Laurence’s involvement, would develop an appropriate IEP for 
Chris for the next school year. He emphasized that the school system would litigate the juvenile court 
petition before the ALJ in the due process hearing. After filing the request for a due process hearing, 
Mike L. requested that the juvenile court hearing, which was scheduled for July 8th, be postponed. The 
case was continued indefinitely. 
119. District Court Brief for Defendants, supra note 116, at 12.
120. Id.
121. See In re Male Special Educ. Student Age 14 (Tenn. Bd. of Educ. Oct. 9, 1987) (on file with author); In 
Re McCann, No. 158, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 125 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 1990). 
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 The due process hearing was conducted on June 28, 1993.122 The only issue was 
the propriety of the juvenile court filing. Dr. Laurence, a specialist in treating people 
with AD/HD, testified that the main goal of his therapy sessions with Chris was to 
“stabilize and contain his ADD problem.”123 He described the chief features of AD/
HD and concluded that the behavior that formed the basis for the juvenile court 
petition was a manifestation of Chris’s AD/HD.124 In forming this opinion, he 
alluded to Chris’s attention difficulties, his impulsivity, and his difficulties with self-
control (a form of “noncompliance”).125 The cross-examination of Dr. Laurence 
centered on the problems that the L. family was experiencing.126
 The next witness was Mike L. He dispassionately reviewed Chris’s history of 
school difficulties, his frustrations with the treatment that Chris had received at 
school, and his efforts to provide support for Chris.127 Mike L. testified that when he 
was informed at the meeting on May 17th that the juvenile court petition would not 
be withdrawn, “I was just, like, in shock.”128 Mike L.’s cross-examination was 
unremarkable. Its prime thrust was to shift the locus of Chris’s problems from his 
school performance and his AD/HD to the turmoil that Chris had experienced since 
his parents’ divorce.129
122. Because of the short time frame, there was little discovery prior to the due process hearing. Chris’s 
lengthy school records were obtained. The school system requested documents from Dr. Laurence, but 
he only had maintained sparse treatment notes. As required by administrative rule, the names of 
potential witnesses were exchanged five days before the hearing. Mike L. and Dr. Laurence were listed 
for the family. The school system listed the names of the principal and several administrators of the 
special education program. Due Process Hearing Transcript, supra note 63, at 2–15.
123. Id. at 41. Dr Laurence observed: “I thought he was beginning to develop some negativistic and 
oppositional behaviors as well; very touchy, temperamental, moody, angry, tending to avoid taking 
responsibility for himself and assigning blame onto others.” Id. at 42.
124. Id. at 52. The chief features were as follows:
 Attention Deficit Disorder, with or without hyperactivity, in this case with hyperactivity, 
is a disorder characterized by excessive degrees and amounts of behavior, generally 
around three dimensions; attention, impulsivity, and hyperactivity. . . . It is generally 
these three factors that people look at when they make the diagnosis, and then each of 
these factors have a variety of symptoms and behavior patterns that are quite common 
to that.
 Id. at 38.
125. Id. at 73. Dr. Laurence testified that Chris never wavered from the contention that he did not cause the 
actual damage, instead blaming it on the other boy. Id. at 172.
126. These problems stemmed from the divorce of Chris’s father and natural mother. Chris was also having 
difficulties in his relationship with his stepmother. Dr. Laurence was working with Chris, his father, 
and stepmother on these issues. Id. at 40–43.
127. Id. at 98–157.
128. Id. at 152.
129. See id. at 158–74.
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 The school system called no witnesses. The Director of Special Education for 
the school system was present for the entire hearing, but he did not testify.130 The 
school system argued that the ALJ did not have “ jurisdiction” to hear the juvenile 
court matter and that the IDEA did not grant immunity to students with disabilities 
shielding them from prosecution.131
 On July 28, 1993, the ALJ rendered his opinion. The findings of fact and 
conclusions of law began as follows:
The student has a history of behavioral problems and poor grades which have 
been addressed by his parent in every manner suggested by school personnel 
to include medical examination and diagnosis of ADHD, individual 
educational services from Sylvan Learning Center, psychological services, 
changes in medication prescribed for ADHD, and numerous meetings with 
school personnel.132
Finding that the behavior underlying the juvenile court petition was a manifestation 
of Chris’s disability, the ALJ held that the filing of the petition should be considered 
“the initiation of a change in placement and/or disciplinary action commensurate 
with expulsion or suspension for more than ten days.”133 The ALJ found that by not 
timely certifying Chris for special education and by not conducting a manifestation 
hearing prior to the filing of the petition, the school had violated its obligations 
under the IDEA.134 The school was ordered to “take all actions necessary to seek 
dismissal of the juvenile court petition filed against the student.”135
 Seeking to enforce immediate implementation of the decision, the L. family filed 
a state court action under the Tennessee Administrative Procedures Act (“TAPA”) 
seeking to compel the school system to withdraw the juvenile court petition.136 TAPA 
provides that the decision of an ALJ must be complied within fifteen days unless a 
stay is granted.137 This proactive maneuver, if successful, would have mooted the 
only issue in the case, which was yet to be appealed.
 D. A Federal Case
 During the time that the TAPA case was awaiting an expedited hearing in state 
court, the school system filed its own appeal of the ALJ’s decision in the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee, which is vested with 
130. Although the IDEA contains a provision that permits the introduction of new evidence if the decision 
of the ALJ is appealed to either federal or state court, this authority is left largely to the discretion of the 
district court judge. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(ii) (2006).
131. Due Process Hearing Transcript, supra note 63, at 16–17.
132. Due Process Hearing Final Order, supra note 60, at 16–17.
133. Id. at 19.
134. Id. at 8–20.
135. Id. at 20. Following the ALJ decision, the school system had sixty days to appeal.
136. Jurisdiction was based on Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 49-10-601(h)(1), 49-10-602 (2009).
137. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-318(f)(3) (2009).
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jurisdiction over IDEA appeals.138 This stayed the enforcement of the ALJ order. 
During the fall of 1993, Chris started ninth grade at his zoned high school with an 
IEP that specified several behavioral goals and the methods to reach them.139 The 
pretrial process culminated with an agreement that each party could submit limited 
additional evidence through depositions, affidavits, or exhibits.140 The court would 
then hear oral arguments and decide the case. But other developments punctuated 
the routine course of this litigation.
 While the case was pending, Chris was caught in school with a small amount of 
marijuana. In pleadings to the district court, the Knox County Schools asserted that 
they did not know how to proceed with this incident and wanted guidance.141 Mike 
L. believed that the episode warranted a review of Chris’s IEP, not disciplinary 
punishment. In pleadings, it was argued that this was a new matter unripe to 
incorporate into the existing case, and that, in any event, the school system was 
seeking an improper advisory opinion.142 The court ultimately agreed, and the matter 
was dropped from the litigation. Chris was “punished” by his parents, and continued 
uninterrupted in school.
 At the hearing on February 4, 1994, the school system’s local attorney pleaded 
with the court that it was hamstrung by the ALJ’s decision in dealing with special 
education students who committed acts of delinquency, as Chris L. allegedly had 
done.143 They alluded to hypothetical special education students who committed 
murder, rape, sexual molestation, aggravated assault, or weapons offenses, arguing 
that the school system could not find appropriate placements for students who were 
violent.144 In response to this “parade of horribles,” as it was characterized by Chris’s 
lawyers, it was emphasized that the Supreme Court had confronted the same issue in 
Honig v. Doe, and had identified educational methods and legal avenues under the 
IDEA for school systems to pursue.145 The judge was also unmoved by the brief 
testimony by the Director of Special Education that, because approximately 20% of 
138. Chris L., 927 F. Supp at 267–68. Jurisdiction was proper pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3) (2006).
139. Brief in Support of Motion to Supplement the Record at 2, Morgan v. Chris L., 927 F. Supp. 267 (E.D. 
Tenn. 1994) (No. 3-93-cv-524) [hereinafter Brief in Support of Motion to Supplement the Record] (on 
file with author).
140. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (2006).
141. Brief in Support of Motion to Supplement the Record, supra note 139, at 1–2.
142. Response in Opposition to the Plaintiff ’s Motion to Supplement the Record, Morgan v. Chris L., 927 
F. Supp. 267 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 3, 1994) (No. 3-93-cv-524) (on file with author).
143. The distinction between delinquent and unruly acts is an elusive one. Compare Tenn. Code Ann. 
§ 37-1-102(b)(9) (2009) (delinquent acts), with Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-102(b)(25) (2009) (unruly 
child). See infra note 293 and accompanying text.
144. Transcript of Oral Argument at 22, Morgan v. Chris L., 927 F. Supp. 267 (E.D. Tenn. 1994) (No. 
3-93-cv-524) (on file with author).
145. Id. at 23. In response to an argument by the school system that parents at an M-team would never agree 
to the filing of a juvenile court petition, the judge responded, “Write your congressman.” Id. at 24.
926
DecriMiNaLiZiNG STUDeNTS wiTh DiSaBiLiTieS
the students in the Knox County Schools were IDEA certified, the ALJ’s decision 
would wreak havoc on school discipline.146
 The decision came down seven months later. On October 9, 1987, the district 
judge ruled four-square in favor of Chris.147 Adopting the facts essentially as they were 
presented by the L. family, the court first relied on a Tennessee IDEA due process 
opinion that ordered a school system “to do everything it can” to dismiss a juvenile 
court petition.148 In particular, the court adopted the rationale of In re McCann,149 a 
four-year-old case decided by the Tennessee Court of Appeals. In McCann, a rural 
school district filed a juvenile court petition against Tony McCann, a boy with mental 
and emotional disabilities who was physically and verbally abusive to teachers and who 
was involved in fighting and other disruptive behavior.150 No M-team meeting was 
held to determine whether the behavior was a manifestation of Tony’s disabilities. After 
the petition was filed, the juvenile court judge ordered Tony’s mother to keep him out 
of school pending a court-ordered evaluation.151 Eventually, Tony was placed in the 
temporary custody of the state because of his mother’s inability to curb his behaviors at 
home.152 The Tennessee Court of Appeals found that the school system had violated 
the IDEA and cognate Tennessee regulations, holding that “[t]he school system must 
follow mandated administrative procedures before turning the handicapped student 
over to the juvenile court system.”153
 Next, the court rejected the argument that, by divesting the juvenile court of 
jurisdiction, the Tennessee Department of Education wielded the power of a “super-
legislature,” ultimately holding that the ALJ’s order did not direct the juvenile court 
to do a thing as the remedy was directed at the Knox County Schools—proper parties 
in an IDEA proceeding.154 The court also deferred to the ALJ’s findings that Chris’s 
behavior was a manifestation of his AD/HD.155 Based on this finding, the court 
146. The District Judge also rejected the import of the proffered affidavits of the Juvenile Judge and Chief 
Probation Officer. The district judge stated: “I don’t need Judge Garrett, I don’t need a probation 
officer. You know, I’ve been a lawyer for more than thirty years, and I’ve been a judge for more than 
thirteen years, so I have some idea of what goes on in juvenile court and I’ve practiced in juvenile 
court. . . . I don’t know anything the judge or probation officer can tell me about juvenile court since 
they have nothing to do with this particular case.” Id. at 25.
147. In re Male Special Educ. Student Age 14 (Tenn. Bd. of Educ. Oct. 9, 1987) (on file with author).
148. Id. at 17 (ALJ ordered school system to “do everything it can” to have petition filed in juvenile court 
dismissed).
149. In re McCann, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 125. The decision was written by an appeals court judge who 
was soon elevated to the Tennessee Supreme Court. Tony McCann was represented by a legal services 
lawyer who was part of the author’s informal practice group.
150. Id. This was deemed an “unruly” petition. 
151. In re McCann, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 125, at *4.
152. Id. 
153. Id. at *11.
154. Chris L., 927 F. Supp. at 270–71.
155. Id. at 271–72.
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disposed of the school’s argument that, from a therapeutic standpoint, Chris would 
have been better off facing the ordinary consequences of his alleged actions in the 
juvenile court.156 Finally, the court relied on the testimony of Dr. Laurence and the 
deposition testimony of a psychiatrist who evaluated Chris at the school system’s 
request to counter the school’s contention that Chris was misdiagnosed with AD/HD 
instead of Oppositional Defiant Disorder (“ODD”), which would not have qualified 
Chris for IDEA eligibility.157
 E. Appeal
 The school system appealed the judgment to the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit.158 Lawyers from around the country saw the decision as a 
vehicle for confronting school systems that increasingly were using juvenile courts to 
banish problem children with disabilities from the schools.159 The Knox County 
Schools began a campaign to convince other school systems to support its positions 
in the appeal.160 There was an attempt at several settlement conferences with a Sixth 
Circuit mediator to bridge the principled differences, but no compromise was 
reached.
 As briefing proceeded, the school system made the same technical arguments it 
did in the district court. It argued that the filing of the petition did not constitute a 
change of placement under the IDEA, and therefore no procedural protections were 
156. Id. at 271.
157. Id. at 271–72. ODD is a potential qualifying disorder under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. See 
29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006).
158. An Atlanta law firm supplanted the Knox County Law Director as lead counsel. While the appeal was 
pending, another round of litigation commenced over the L. family’s entitlement as prevailing parties to 
statutory attorney’s fees under 20 U.S.C § 1415(i)(3)(B) (2006). Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d) was relatively new 
at the time, and the plaintiffs were one day late in meeting the rule’s fourteen-day limitation on filing a 
petition for fees. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition for fees as untimely. If the rule had 
specified ten days to file fee petitions, the petition would have been timely, given intervening weekends 
and holidays. It took approximately six months and the authority of a recent Supreme Court decision, 
but the district court ultimately ruled that the delay was excusable neglect that did not have any adverse 
impact on the school system. The district court proceeded to award substantially all of the fees requested. 
Chris L., 927 F. Supp. at 272.
159. Because of the nationwide scope of the issues, amicus assistance was sought from the Center for Law 
and Education and the Protection and Advocacy organizations in the Sixth Circuit. Amicus briefs for 
Chris L. were filed by the Center for Law and Education, the Michigan Protection and Advocacy 
Service, and Ohio Legal Rights Service. See, e.g., Brief for Center for Law and Education and Juvenile 
Law Center as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendant-Appellee, Morgan v. Chris L., 106 F.3d 401 (6th 
Cir. 1997) (No. 94-6561) (on file with author).
160. Amicus briefs for the Knox County Schools were filed by Metropolitan Nashville and Davidson County 
School System and the National School Boards Association. See Brief for Metropolitan Nashville and 
Davidson County School System as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant, Morgan v. Chris L., 
106 F.3d 401 (6th Cir. 1997) (No. 94-6561) (on file with author); Brief for National School Boards 
Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant, Morgan v. Chris L., 106 F.3d 401 (6th 
Cir. 1997) (No. 94-6561) (on file with author).
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necessary before filing.161 It also elaborated on the far-reaching adverse consequences 
it believed f lowed from the district court’s decision. To illustrate, the school system’s 
brief posed what it termed a hypothetical:
If a disabled student rapes a school teacher at school, under the ruling of the 
District Court, prior to reporting such conduct to juvenile authorities, written 
notice must be provided that an M-team meeting will be held and the parents 
are invited to attend. At the M-team meeting, the M-team could decide that 
the rape was not a manifestation of the student’s disability, and only then 
could it decide that the juvenile authorities should be alerted. However, 
pursuant to the ruling of the District Court, if the parents object to the 
M-Team’s decision regarding manifestation, the parents can, at that point, 
initiate a due process hearing and the disabled student will remain in the 
current educational placement during the pendency of the due process 
proceedings.162
The school system said that this meant that neither the school system nor the teacher 
could file charges with the juvenile court until the due process proceedings and court 
review are completed.
 For the first time, the school system raised constitutional objections to the ruling 
of the ALJ and the district court. The first was premised on Article I, Section 8, the 
Spending Clause, and Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman.163 The school 
system argued that the decision below imposed an intrusive obligation—barring the 
filing of a petition—that was beyond the scope of congressional power.164 The second 
constitutional argument, which was grounded in the Tenth Amendment and Gregory 
v. Ashcroft, asserted that the district court’s prohibition on filing criminal petitions 
intruded on the “traditional state function of protecting its citizens from the perpetration 
of crimes by juveniles and of providing needed rehabilitation services to them.”165 These 
constitutional arguments, which were rooted in the new federalism jurisprudence of 
the Rehnquist Court, sought to immunize school systems from the reach of the federal 
mandates of the IDEA. If the IDEA was not premised on the power of Congress 
under the Fourteenth Amendment, as was argued by the school system, but only 
bottomed on the Spending Clause, then a federal court ruling that mandated that a 
161. Brief of Appellant at 15–33, Morgan v. Chris L., 106 F.3d 401 (6th Cir. 1997) (No. 94-6561) (on file 
with author).
162. Id. at 30.
163. Id. at 35–37; Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp., 451 U.S. at 1 (Congress exceeded its authority under the 
Spending Power to require Pennsylvania to fund the “bill of rights” provision of the Developmentally 
Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6010(1)–(2) (2006)). The appellants conceded 
that all circuits had held that the IDEA was also enacted pursuant to section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.
164. Brief of Appellant, supra note 161, at 35–37.
165. Id. at 38–40; Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (Congress did not intend to include state judges 
under the protections of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–624 
(2006), because there is no plain statement of such intention in the statute). 
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school system refrain from prosecuting a student with disabilities—a power not 
expressly included in the IDEA—was beyond the realm of congressional power.
 The National School Boards Association (“NSBA”) and the Metropolitan 
Nashville and Davidson County School System filed amicus briefs. Both cited a 
rising tide of school violence and the role that juvenile courts play in combating 
crimes in school.166 They also emphasized the responsibilities of school systems to 
promote school safety and protect the majority of students.167 Each claimed that the 
district court decision would prohibit schools from calling the police or would require 
the police to make on-the-spot determinations about a student’s disability.168 Chris’s 
bathroom incident was transformed into a scenario where a “student brings an Uzi to 
school and starts shooting people.”169
 The appellees’ brief highlighted the limited nature of the district court’s decision 
and its grounding in the language, purpose, and history of the IDEA and state law.170 
It conceded that school systems could call the police, mental health crisis units, or 
any other resource to aid in responding to students who exhibit disruptive or 
dangerous behaviors. Specifically, the brief argued that schools could not be 
prohibited from calling the police in cases of serious violence.171
 The brief raised several pivotal questions: What constituted a “crime” in the 
context of misbehavior at school? Could the distinction between “unruly” behavior 
and “delinquent” behavior stand up to close scrutiny? Shouldn’t the institution best 
equipped to devise corrective plans for students, and not an entity like the juvenile 
court (whose resources are scarce and whose expertise with children with disabilities 
is sorely lacking), be the entity of first choice for dealing with misconduct?172
 The amici for the appellees—the Center for Law and Education, the Juvenile 
Law Center of Philadelphia, the Michigan and Ohio protection and advocacy 
programs, and Children and Adults with Attention Deficit Disorders (“CHADD”)—
broadened the context of the case. In particular, the Michigan and Ohio protection 
and advocacy programs and CHADD presented studies demonstrating the over-
representation of children with disabilities in the juvenile court system, identifying 
as a chief cause of this phenomenon the paucity of community-based services for 
166. Brief for National School Boards Association, supra note 160, at 8; Brief for Metropolitan Nashville and 
Davidson County School System, supra note 160, at 8–9.
167. Brief for National School Boards Association, supra note 160, at 8–11; Brief for Metropolitan Nashville 
and Davidson County School System, supra note 160, at 4.
168. Brief for National School Boards Association, supra note 160, at 11–13; Brief for Metropolitan Nashville 
and Davidson County School System, supra note 160, at 8–10.
169. Brief for National School Boards Association, supra note 160, at 2.
170. Brief of Appellees at 26, Morgan v. Chris L., 106 F.3d 401 (6th Cir. 1997) (No. 94-6561) (on file with 
author).
171. Id. at 42–44. It was the myriad of cases like Chris’s that troubled special education lawyers and advocates 
across the country.
172. Id. at 43. The brief also concisely responded to the new constitutional arguments of the school system, 
figuring that the Sixth Circuit would not be interested in hearing these claims for the first time on 
appeal in a case that rested predominantly on statutory grounds. Id. at 44 n.11.
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children with mental and emotional disabilities, including school system programs.173 
These briefs also pointed out the inextricable connection between a student’s learning 
and behavior and the many options that are available to schools, working in 
conjunction with other agencies with behavioral expertise, to address these problems 
through a comprehensive approach.174
 The case was argued on April 16, 1996, before Judges Richard Surheinrich 
(Michigan), Guy R. Cole (Ohio), and Leroy J. Contie (Ohio).175 The Atlanta counsel for 
the Knox County Schools began by emphasizing that the issue on appeal was a “pure 
issue of law as to whether the district court erred in adopting a per se rule that in every 
instance in which a school official files a petition with Juvenile Court that that constitutes 
a change in placement under IDEA that must go through the Act’s procedures.”176 The 
judges inquired into the criteria that the school system used in deciding whether to file 
a juvenile petition and whether the school system had a policy that embodied these 
criteria.177 The school system’s attorney had to concede that there were neither criteria 
nor a policy.178 The judges seemed sympathetic to Chris’s problem. Judge Contie noted 
that “[the school system is] trying to separate out the manifestation of the crime . . . [b]
ut the manifestation of the act resulting from [Chris’s] disability is intertwined with his 
problem, and you can’t guarantee that [Chris] isn’t going to be sent to a juvenile home 
173. Brief for Michigan Protection & Advocacy Service, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendant-
Appellee at 5–10, Morgan v. Chris L., 106 F.3d 401 (6th Cir. 1997) (No. 94–6561) (on file with 
author).
174. Id. at 20–24; Brief for Center for Law and Education and Juvenile Law Center, supra note 159, at 13–19. 
The briefs admonished that the decision below was a bulwark counseling against the practice of 
transforming educational disputes into criminal ones. Brief for Michigan Protection & Advocacy 
Service, Inc. et al., supra note 173, at 38–42; Brief for Center for Law and Education and Juvenile Law 
Center, supra note 159, at 19–23.
175. Counsel did not learn the composition of the panel until the morning of the argument. Having 
researched all IDEA decisions in the Circuit, the Appellees were able to quickly determine that none of 
the judges on the panel had written an IDEA decision in the past. Judge Surheinrich was a President 
George Bush appointee; Judge Cole had been recently appointed by President Clinton; Judge Contie, a 
senior judge, was appointed by President Reagan.
176. Transcript of Oral Arguments at 2, Morgan v. Chris L., 106 F.3d 401 (6th Cir. 1996) (No. 94-6561) 
[hereinafter Sixth Circuit Oral Arguments] (on file with author).
177. Almost immediately, Judge Surheinrich asked:
JS: Counsel, would that mean that any time a crime is committed it must be reported to 
the juvenile . . .
CW: No sir, not every crime.
JS: If it’s a per se rule why wouldn’t it? Why wouldn’t you have as a citizen the obligation 
if it’s a per se rule to report every crime to the authorities?
* * *
CW: Your honor, the answer to that is no. There are some crimes that by federal and 
state law must be reported but not all crimes are required to be reported.
 Id. 
178. Id. at 2–3.
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for twenty days.”179 Toward the end of the appellant’s argument, Judge Cole summarized 
his view of the school system’s constitutional and statutory claims:
I have some difficulty, personally . . . accepting your argument that there is 
an infringement here on sovereign rights that are historically and traditionally 
left to the states. It seems to me . . . that we’ve got a situation where the 
school system arguably ignored federal law and failed to attend to the 
educational needs of a child for an entire school year. And that this discipline 
problem escalated because of the failure of the school system to follow Federal 
law and guidelines in terms of putting together a program for this kid, and 
this escalated into maybe a more serious discipline problem, and now the 
school system seeks to discipline him through the criminal system as opposed 
to through a structured program . . . . I guess maybe we’re looking at this 
through different prisms, but it seems to me that the school system is seeking 
to punish a child for the school system’s ineptitude.180
 The issue of when “reporting” of crimes should take place was a palpably sensitive 
one at the heart of the case. It had been decided during preparation for the oral 
argument that, if pressed, the appellees would take the position that the school 
system could and should report dangerous actions to the police.181 In response to 
Judge Surheinrich’s question whether “there should . . . be a per se rule . . . that says 
that reporting a crime is a change of position,”182 the counsel for the appellees 
responded as follows: “The answer your Honor is we don’t read a per se rule into the 
District Court’s decision. The nature of IDEA litigation is individualized.”183 The 
remaining questions sought to clarify the IDEA manifestation process and the 
relationship of this process to juvenile court proceedings.
 The case remained under submission for nine months.184 On January 21, 1997, 
the panel, in a per curiam decision, which was not recommended for publication, 
affirmed the judgment of the district court. The opinion tracked the child-focused, 
disability-driven, school-failure emphasis that had been pursued from the beginning 
of the case. It posed the issue on appeal as “whether on May 12, 1993, by filing a 
juvenile court petition for the alleged destruction of school property, the Knox 
County School System was in violation of IDEA procedural requirements insuring 
179. Id. at 4.
180. Id. at 5.
181. A Tennessee statute vests exclusively in the principal the authority to report serious crimes to law 
enforcement. Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-6-4301(a) (2007).
182. Sixth Circuit Oral Arguments, supra note 176, at 7.
183. Id. The appellees had internally debated whether to insist that every act of misconduct, however severe, 
be treated the same, or concede that the facts of this case, as found by the ALJ and the district court, 
warranted the finding of a potential change of placement here. The latter point could not be pressed too 
vigorously. Even though Judge Contie envisioned Chris potentially spending twenty days in juvenile 
detention, this was an unlikely result even from the most punitive juvenile judge.
184. During that time, the appellees continued to consult by telephone with disability rights attorneys and 
public defenders from across the country who were using the district court decision either in the IDEA 
proceedings or in juvenile court.
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[sic] Chris’s rights.”185 It next discussed the relevant provisions of the IDEA—AD/HD 
eligibility, discipline, change of placement—and the leading cases interpreting these 
sections, stressing the importance of the procedural safeguards “as a means of curbing 
the unilateral ability of schools to punish a disabled student for behavior that is a 
manifestation of the student’s disabilities.”186 The court specifically noted that “the 
decisions of the ALJ and the district court simply require that schools contemplating 
juvenile petitions do what the IDEA requires of them.”187
 Echoing the sentiments that Judge Cole had expressed in oral argument, the 
opinion continued with several propositions that were raised but not pressed. The 
first was the recognition that when schools fail to comply with the strictures of the 
IDEA, children with disabilities can be causally harmed: “When school systems fail 
to accommodate a disabled students’ [sic] behavioral problems, these problems may 
be attributed to the school system’s failure to comply with the requirements of the 
IDEA.”188 Next, the opinion acknowledged the phenomenon of disciplinary exclusion, 
including the specter of bad faith by the school system: “Indeed, rather than affording 
Chris the procedural safeguards mandated by the IDEA, the Knox County Schools 
sought to exclude him through a punitive and disciplinary measure in juvenile 
court.”189 Finally, the decision recognized the invalidity of the schools’ position that 
they were merely seeking more effective services for Chris: “By resorting to juvenile 
court, the school system is, at a minimum, proposing that the juvenile court develop 
its own program of rehabilitative services for Chris.”190 The court went on to state 
that, “pursuant to the IDEA’s procedural safeguards . . . the school system must 
adopt its own plan and institute an M-team meeting before initiating a juvenile court 
petition for this purpose.”191
 F. Talking Out of School
 The local press was critical of the decision and its supposed implications.192 One 
headline read, “Court Ruling Hurting Schools.”193 The accompanying article stated 
that a school bus driver had informed the superintendent that students on his bus, who 
185. Morgan v. Chris L., No. 94-6561, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 1041, at *7 (6th Cir. Jan. 21, 1997).
186. Id. at *14.
187. Id.
188. Id. at *14–15.
189. Id. at *15.
190. Id. at *17.
191. Id. The decision cited a Tennessee juvenile court statute requiring that a petition for delinquent or 
unruly conduct must allege “that the child is in need of treatment or rehabilitation.” Tenn. Code Ann. 
§ 37-1-120(1) (2009).
192. David Keim, Knox Loses Special Education Case: County Ignored Federal Rules in Charging Unruly Disabled 
Student-Appeals Court, Knoxville News-Sentinel, Jan. 23, 1997, at A1. 
193. David Keim, Court Ruling Hurting Schools: Officials Say Decision Limits Discipline of Special-Ed Students, 
Knoxville News-Sentinel, Jan. 25, 1997, at A1. 
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had read about the decision in the paper that morning, said “Well, gee, we can do 
anything we want to now . . . . Because I’m [hyperactive] . . . I can do whatever I want 
and get by with it. I can kick the wall or whatever.”194
 Another story followed: “Does Disability Place Pupil Beyond Law? Knox Case 
May Go to Supreme Court.”195 It quoted Chris’s version of what had transpired.196 
Mike L. was quoted as saying that although he believed that Chris should have 
suffered consequences for being in an unauthorized bathroom, the juvenile charges 
were too severe.197 He was worried that a juvenile record might hinder Chris’s chances 
of getting a job.198 The article further noted that Chris confessed that he sometimes 
used his disability to his advantage when he did not want to do school work, but 
stated that he now was more mature and wanted to help his natural mother pay her 
bills.199 The article concluded with this quote from Chris: “[T]he school system 
wanted to use me as an example and they’ve just pushed it just too far.”200
G. Certiorari
 “Our legal counsel messed up,” a spokesperson for the Knox County Schools said 
when the system’s petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc was dismissed as 
untimely by one day.201 But with the decision to file for certiorari already announced, 
the school system evidently had decided to go for broke. It hired Carter Phillips, a 
highly regarded Supreme Court practitioner of Sidley Austin in Washington D.C., 
to write the certiorari petition.202 Alan Morrison of the Public Citizen Litigation 
Group, an experienced and talented Supreme Court advocate, agreed to steer the 
respondents through the certiorari process, pro bono.203 The amici in the Sixth 
Circuit agreed to join in opposing certiorari.
194. Id.
195. David Keim, Does Disability Place Pupil Beyond Law? Knox Case May Go to Supreme Court, Knoxville 
News-Sentinel, Jan. 30, 1997, at A1.
196. Id. As he consistently had done, he pointed the finger at the other boy and recounted how, when he 
went to the office to report the incident, he was told that he was suspended when the principal saw that 





201. David Keim, Special-Ed Appeal Lost Because of Missed Deadline: County Plans to Go to Supreme Court, 
Knoxville News-Sentinel, Feb. 25, 1997, at A1.
202. His retainer agreement with the school system called for a cap on payment of $25,000 plus expenses for 
preparing the petition, “lobbying the Solicitor General,” and working with amici. Letter from Carter G. 
Phillips, Sidley Austin, to Richard Beeler, Knox County Law Director (Apr. 1, 1997) (on file with 
author). The retainer agreement was obtained through a statutory open records request to the Knox 
County Law Department.
203. There is much arcana surrounding Supreme Court practice, and a seasoned hand was an invaluable 
resource, as will be seen. 
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 The school system’s certiorari petition was filed on April 21, 1997. Its tone was 
alarmist:
The decision of the Sixth Circuit has sent shockwaves throughout both the 
state educational community and the state juvenile justice systems. School 
officials, who are legitimately concerned with the safety and security of 
students and school property, must now consider whether a student who 
engaged in illegal conduct may have a disability and whether the procedures 
of the IDEA must therefore be satisfied before seeking the intervention of 
juvenile justice authorities.204
The petition cited statistics on school violence and discussed how schools were having 
tremendous difficulties responding to the problem of delinquency.205 Citing federalism 
concerns, the petition argued that the lack of clear authority in the IDEA could not 
justify the appropriation of core state functions such as school discipline and juvenile 
justice.206 The petition further claimed that the Sixth Circuit decision constituted a 
“breathtaking” arrogation of state power and an affront to federalism, and that the 
expansive reading of the IDEA’s stay-put provision was in conflict with Congress’s 
intentions and with Honig v. Doe.207 The petition exclaimed: “The notion that a 
school official dealing with delinquent behavior should consider first the commands 
of the IDEA before invoking the powers of the juvenile justice system is nothing 
short of astonishing.”208
 The amici on behalf of the Knox County Schools, the NSBA and the Georgia 
School Boards Association (“GSBA”), were equally harsh in their assessments of the 
potential for mischief caused by the Sixth Circuit decision. Although Chris 
committed simple vandalism, the NSBA argued that the rationale of the decision 
would apply “when a student brings an Uzi to school and starts shooting people.”209 
Noting that 20% of students with serious emotional disorders are arrested at least 
once before they leave school, the NSBA posed the ultimate hypothetical:
Under the rule established in the decision below, if a student is holding 
another student or a teacher at gunpoint or a serious gang fight involving 
disabled students breaks out in the school, school officials would be in 
violation of the IDEA if they called the police because the student may be 
ultimately incarcerated.210
204. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, Morgan v. Chris L., 520 U.S. 1271 (1997) (No. 96-1681) (on file 
with author).
205. Id. at 8 n.2.
206. Id. at 8.
207. Id. at 10–11.
208. Id. at 14.
209. Motion and Brief Amicus Curiae of National School Boards Association in Support of Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari at 3, Morgan v. Chris L., 520 U.S. 1271 (1997) (No. 96-1681) (on file with author).
210. Id. at 17–18.
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The GSBA followed suit. It argued that “[i]n the calculus of values inherent in public 
schools, there can be no higher priority than that which should be accorded to the 
personal safety and protection of innocent students . . . .”211 The GSBA urged that 
the Court “should not sanction a Court decision which seems to give violent, 
disruptive, disabled children a license to pillage, maim, and even kill, free from the 
traditional criminal processes relied upon to protect human life and property.”212
 Wanting to avoid Supreme Court review, counsel for the L. family insistently 
pursued the dismissal of the juvenile court petition. They succeeded in obtaining an 
official determination from the juvenile court that it had dismissed the petition and 
destroyed Chris’s records.213 With the dismissal and Chris turning eighteen, it was 
argued that the matter was moot. The rest of the brief in opposition stressed the 
fact-driven, local nature of the ruling. The decisions of all three tribunals, it was 
pointed out, rested on state court cases and state education rulings. These cases were 
squarely situated within the remedial purposes of the IDEA.
 H. The 1997 Reauthorization of the IDEA
 Throughout the litigation, Congress had been working on the reauthorization of 
the IDEA. It looked as if a bill acceptable to all interests would be enacted in the fall 
of 1996.214 Interest in the bill peaked when lawyers from the Center for Law and 
Education learned that there was a concerted effort by the NSBA to “overrule” Chris 
L. in the reauthorized bill.215
211. Motion and Brief Amicus Curiae on Behalf of Georgia School Boards Association, Inc. in Support of 
Petitioner at 10, Morgan v. Chris L., 520 U.S. 1271 (1997) (No. 96-1681) (on file with author).
212. Id. at 10.
213. The memorandum embodying this determination was written by the juvenile court’s chief probation 
officer. It succinctly described the juvenile court’s handling of this matter:
 The petition in question was filed May 12, 1993 and was set for hearing on July 8, 
1993. On that date the matter was passed to be reset because other litigation was 
pending on this matter in other courts. As that litigation remained active elsewhere the 
petition was never reset in this court. When the youth turned 18 on January 3, 1997 our 
case was closed. At that time, in keeping with our policy, since no formal disposition 
had ever been entered regarding this youth, the record was destroyed and his name has 
been removed from the records of this court.
 Memorandum from Larry Gibney, Knox County Juvenile Court Chief Probation Officer, to Steve 
Griffin, Knox County Schools Chief of Security (Mar. 12, 1997), cited in Respondent’s Brief in 
Opposition at Appendix B, Morgan v. Chris L., 520 U.S. 1271 (1997) (No. 96-1681) (on file with 
author).
214. Key issues surrounding cessation of educational services for students with disabilities who are expelled 
for misbehavior, other disciplinary provisions, assistive technology, and procedural protections were 
close to being resolved.
215. Telephone Interview with Kathleen Boundy, Co-Dir., Ctr. for Law & Educ. (Feb. 1997) (on file with 
author). The Atlanta counsel for the Knox County Schools was an active participant in the NSBA’s legal 
affairs. The school system itself was organizing protests from other Tennessee school systems directed 
toward Tennessee Senator Bill Frist, a physician who was a key player in the reauthorization. 
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 In the negotiations over the reauthorization, the Chris L. case was being portrayed 
by the school system negotiators factually just as it was painted in the briefs and 
certiorari petition of the school system and its allies—an outlier court had immunized 
students with disabilities from prosecution, so the tale went, no matter how severe 
their crimes.216 The image propagated was one of Chris looking like Sylvester Stallone 
carrying an Uzi and running amok in school. Columbine still had not occurred, but 
the fear of such a debacle was exploited.217 This was the IDEA out of control, it was 
claimed. Surely Congress could never have intended this startling result.
 The lawyers and advocates from the disability community worked hard to counter 
this image. They urged congressional staff members to read the decision and judge 
for themselves whether the predicted “parade of horribles” could be pinned on the 
Chris L. litigation. Compromise language was drafted that became part of the 
IDEA.218 This section is entitled “Referral to and Action by Law Enforcement and 
Judicial Authorities,” and states in relevant part:
Nothing in this part shall be construed to prohibit an agency from reporting 
a crime by a child with a disability to appropriate authorities or to prevent 
State law enforcement and judicial authorities from exercising their 
responsibilities with regard to the application of Federal and State law to 
crimes committed by a child with a disability.219
 The disability advocates argued that because Chris L. did not prohibit “referrals,” 
this section was unnecessary and would constitute an open invitation for school 
systems to prosecute students with disabilities in juvenile court. The language 
remained in the bill, however, in part because of the heavy pressure from the NSBA 
and the tacit approval of Senator Frist.220 Furthermore, representatives of the United 
States Department of Education viewed the provision as reasonably innocuous.221 
216. Telephone Interview with Kathleen Boundy, Co-Dir., Ctr. for Law & Educ. (Mar. 1997) (on file with 
author).
217. In February of 1997 a well-publicized school shooting occurred in Bethel, Alaska. There were other 
reported school shootings in October and December of that year. Dave Cullen, Columbine 14 
(2009).
218. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(6)(A) (2006).
219. Id. This provision was denominated a “[r]ule of construction.” For purposes of statutory interpretation, 
this rule should be interpreted to limit this section to the referral of “crimes,” not status offenses like 
truancy. In subsection (B) of this section, the transmission of special education and disciplinary records 
to appropriate referral authorities is permitted only in compliance with the Family Educational Rights 
and Privacy Act (“FERPA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2006). FERPA contains specific exceptions for the 
transmission of records without parental consent. 34 C.F.R. § 300.535(b)(1) (2006). None of these 
exceptions can be read to allow the disclosure of a student’s records to referral authorities without, for 
example, a court order.
220. Telephone Interview with Kathleen Boundy, Co-Dir., Ctr. for Law & Educ. (Apr. 1997) (on file with 
author).
221. Telephone Interview with Thomas Hehir, Former Dir. of Office of Special Educ. Programs, U.S. Dep’t 
of Educ. (Oct. 30, 2002) (on file with author).
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They believed that the section merely codified the holding in Chris L., which they 
concluded did not prohibit referrals to law enforcement personnel.222
 The reauthorization process began again in earnest in January of 1997, almost 
simultaneously with the Sixth Circuit decision. A consensus-based process of 
mediation, led by a key staff member of Senator Trent Lott, went forward.223 When 
the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court, any hope of excluding the new language 
was lost. The disability community worked to prevent any amendments to the new 
provision that would make it easier for schools to refer special education students to 
juvenile court, in part by containing any harmful language in the legislative history. 
They succeeded on both fronts. The only legislative history on this section is a 
statement by Senator Harkin, one of the legislation’s co-sponsors, which stated that 
“[t]he bill also authorizes . . . proper referrals to police and appropriate authorities 
when disabled children commit crimes, so long as the referrals do not circumvent the 
school’s responsibilities under IDEA.”224 A compromise bill was achieved. President 
Clinton signed the legislation on June 4, 1997.225
 After consultation with the Court’s Chief Deputy Clerk, counsel for the 
respondents faxed a letter to the Supreme Court, with a copy to counsel for the Knox 
County Schools. The letter alerted the Court to this new provision in the IDEA, but 
stated that it should have no discernible effect on this case. The next announcement 
day was scheduled for June 9, 1997. On that day, certiorari was denied.226 In 
consultation with the L. family, counsel issued a press release stating in part:
After four years, four successful court decisions, including an appeal to the 
U.S Supreme Court, and the expenditure of hundreds of thousands of dollars 
by the Knox County Schools, this case has concluded successfully for Chris 
and his family. We hope that school system administrators have learned a 
lesson about identifying and educating students with behavioral disabilities. 
Cases like this wouldn’t arise if school administrators pursued a policy of 
helping disabled students and their parents—as the law intends—not fighting 
them in court.227
The school system defended its pursuit of the case. The superintendent said that by 
“continuing on the path we chose,” people focused on the issue and understood “the 
222. A leading special education publication portrayed the 1997 Amendment as “effectively” overruling 
Chris L. Perry A. Zirkel, Prosecuting Disabled Students: IDEA ‘97 Effectively Negates Chris L., The 
Special Educator, June 4, 1999.
223. The staff member had a child with a serious physical and mental disability.
224. 143 Cong. Rec. S4401 (1997) (statement by Sen. Harkin).
225. Office of Special Education & Rehabilitative Services, http://www.ed.gov/offices/OSERS/Policy/
IDEA/the_law.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2010).
226. Chris L., 106 F.3d 401 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied., 520 U.S. 1271 (1997).
227. Press Release, Counsel for Chris L., U.S. Supreme Court Rejects Knox County School’s Appeal in 
Chris L. Case (June 9, 1997) (on file with author).
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absurdity of what schools are dealing with.”228 He called “asinine” the courts’ 
interpretation that “a special-needs student could potentially commit a crime in a 
classroom and escape charges because of his or her condition.”229
 I. The Aftermath
 The following letters to the editor encapsulate the conf licting currents 
surrounding the Chris L. case:
September 24, 1993
Editor, The News-Sentinel
I was appalled to read in The News-Sentinel of an eighth-grader who kicked 
loose a water pipe in a bathroom at Northwest Middle School—causing $800 
in damages—whose parents asked that his juvenile petition be dismissed 
because he has attention deficit disorder. As a parent of a seventh-grader who 
has been treated for ADD and who still has a harder time with school work 
than his classmates of equal intelligence, I know that living with and working 
with ADD children is not an easy task. But ADD kids are not stupid. In fact, 
most are excellent manipulators. The hardest part of living with an ADD 
child is staying in control while working with a kid who knows exactly how to 
push you to the edge. Still, at some point in their lives, all these ADD 
children have to live in the real world—where actions bring consequences. To 
allow a child to perform an act of vandalism and then excuse him by claiming, 
“He can’t help it—he’s ADD,” is not doing the child or society any good. . . . 
I’m glad that his problem has a name and that ADD is recognized as a definite 
learning disability. Knowing what he has, how it affects him and how to 
control it have done wonders for our son’s self-esteem. But as we have 
struggled with ADD in our own family, we have watched it become more and 
more of a catch-all to explain away everything from kids who can’t read to 
kids who pull guns on the teacher. . . . A kid who causes $800 worth of 
damage to school property ought to be personally paying back the $800 to the 




228. Randy Kenner, Knox Appeal of Special-Ed Case Rejected: U.S. Supreme Court Turns Down Petition, 
Knoxville News-Sentinel, June 10, 1997, at A1. 
229. Id. With the cooperation of the lawyer in the Law Director’s office, the case was rapidly settled on a 
fully compensatory amount of attorneys’ fees. The school system paid approximately five times this 
amount to the Atlanta Law Firm and to Sidley Austin.
230. Jane Schuler, Letter to the Editor, Knoxville News-Sentinel, Sept. 24, 1993, at A17.
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October 15, 1993
Editor, The News-Sentinel
Jane Schuler’s letter . . . regarding the child with ADD (attention deficit 
disorder), who is being prosecuted in Juvenile Court for damaging school 
property, needs a reply. I found myself wondering what news story she had 
read, since she evidently read a different story from the one I read. Her 
statement that the child should be made to pay back the damages was 
interesting, to say the least. This is exactly what the parents of the child in 
question offered to the school system. The school system refused to accept 
this, wishing instead to further stigmatize and traumatize an already disturbed 
child by throwing him into the Juvenile Court system, to be arrested, 
handcuffed, strip-searched and locked up in a cage. They apparently feel this 
will help this child a lot more than working with the parents and mental 
health professionals to come up with a placement and services that would 
help this child overcome this type of destructive behavior. . . . No one that I 
know of is advocating that we tolerate such behavior as what occurred at 
Northwest Middle School. What we should be doing is trying to help these 
children by coming up with the psychological, medical and educational 
services they need to overcome this handicap, not putting them in jail. Just as 
you wouldn’t jail an epileptic [child] for having a seizure, you certainly 
shouldn’t treat an ADD or ADHD child any more harshly for displaying his 
or her handicap. One last thought for Ms. Schuler. I suggest that you push 
Knox County Schools to start obeying the state and federal laws regarding 
special education. . . . That means that it is Knox County officials who are 
the lawbreakers, not the ADD child.
Michael Lawson 
Knoxville231
 Public defenders, special education lawyers, and child advocates recognized the 
deleterious consequences surrounding the issue of over-criminalization.232 With the 
shootings at Columbine in 1999 and other highly publicized episodes of school 
violence,233 the open invitation to school systems contained in the 1997 Amendments 
spurred increased use of the juvenile courts to handle in-school misconduct by 
students with disabilities.234 Although statistics do not exist to gauge the exact extent 
231. Michael Lawson, Letter to the Editor, Knoxville News-Sentinel, Oct. 15, 1993, at A13. 
232. Students with disabilities are overrepresented in the juvenile court system. Approximately two-thirds of 
the nation’s juvenile inmates have at least one mental illness. See Solomon Moore, Mentally Ill Offenders 
Strain Juvenile System, N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 2009, at A1. See Dean Hill Rivkin & Brenda McGee, 
Disability Advocacy in Juvenile Delinquency Representation, in Tennessee Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers, A Practical Guide For Juvenile Defense (1997). 
233. See Cullen, supra note 217.
234. Research on rates of exclusion from school shows that students with disabilities are disproportionately 
excluded, despite the strictures of the 1997 IDEA Amendments. See Russell J. Skiba, Special Education 
and School Discipline: A Precarious Balance, 27 Behav. Disorders 81, 84 (2002).
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of this practice,235 knowledgeable lawyers believe that the practice is national in 
scope.236 A recent study by the American Bar Association’s Juvenile Justice Center on 
the state of juvenile courts in Virginia found that the juvenile justice system was 
being loaded down with inappropriate referrals, particularly mental health and 
school-related cases.237 Although IDEA decisions emerged soon after the Chris L. 
decision that acknowledged that impermissible motives often prompted school 
systems to file juvenile court petitions,238 in recent years, judges have been decidedly 
hostile to Chris L.-type claims.239
 This trend of hostility began within weeks of the 1997 reauthorization. A 
Wisconsin state appellate court allowed a juvenile prosecution of a child with a 
disability to go forward, distinguishing Chris L. on state law grounds because the 
district attorney had initiated the case (as required by Wisconsin law) instead of the 
school officials.240 The student, who was diagnosed as emotionally disturbed at age 
three, was partially enrolled in classes for students with emotional disabilities.241 He 
235. See generally U.S. Dep’t of Educ. et al., Nat’l Center for Educ. Statistics, Indicators of 
School Crime and Safety: 2002 iii (2002), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2003/2003009.pdf. 
Statistics on school crime show that in 1996–97, 10% of all public schools reported at least one serious 
violent crime to a law enforcement representative. Id. at 18. Another 47% of public schools reported a 
less serious violent or nonviolent crime. Id. The remaining 43% of public schools did not report any of 
these crimes to the police. Id. The vast majority of crimes reported by public schools were of the less 
serious violent or nonviolent type. Id. In the 1996–97 reporting period, 424,000 total crimes were 
reported to the police; 402,000 of these were of the less serious nature. Id. 
236. See Eileen L. Ordover, When Schools Criminalize Disability: Education Law Strategies for Legal 
Advocates iii (Nov. 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). In 1996, the National Council 
on Disability found that “schools still try to expel or suspend students who present behavioral or other 
special challenges.” Nat’l Council on Disability, Improving the Implementation of the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: Making Schools Work for All of America’s 
Children, Supplement viii (1996), available at http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2sql/
content_storage_01/0000019b/80/14/86/85.pdf.
237. ABA Juvenile Justice Ctr., A Call for Justice: An Assessment of Access to Counsel and 
Quality of Representation in Delinquency Proceedings 4–5, 20–23 (2002), available at http://
www.njdc.info/pdf/cfjfull.pdf; see also The Advancement Project & The Harvard Civil Rights 
Project, Opportunities Suspended: The Devastating Consequences of Zero Tolerance and 
School Discipline Policies (2000), available at http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/
discipline/opport_suspended.php.
238. See, e.g., Cabot Sch. Dist., 29 IDELR 300 (Ark. SEA 1998) (the “call to the police by agent of the 
school was not . . . placed for the purpose of preserving the legitimate safety of the students and the 
faculty, but was made for . . . purposes of avoiding compliance with the child’s behavior management 
plan . . . and of causing a change in placement.”).
239. See, e.g., Joseph M. v. Southeast Delco Sch. Dist., No. 99-4645, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2994, at *16–17 
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 2001) (holding that section 1415(k)(9)(A) overruled the Chris L. determination that 
filing of juvenile petition constituted change of placement); Commonwealth v. Nathaniel N., 764 
N.E.2d 883, 886–87 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002) (student with disabilities prosecuted for possession of small 
amount of marijuana in school and found not entitled to IDEA procedural protections); State v. Trent 
N., 569 N.W.2d 719 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997) (IDEA procedures need not be exhausted before state can 
file delinquency petition for disabled student who was on juvenile court probation).
240. Trent N., 569 N.W.2d at 725; see also Nathaniel N., 764 N.E.2d at 886–87.
241. Trent N., 569 N.W.2d at 722.
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was prosecuted for three incidents: in one, he allegedly hit another student; in 
another, he allegedly lit a match and threw it into a school locker; and in a final 
incident, he was accused of disorderly conduct.242 His parents contested the adequacy 
of his school program under the due process procedures of the IDEA. The court, 
however, reasoned that the Chris L. remedy—withdrawal of the juvenile petition—
was unavailable as against the district attorney.243 Several years later, a pair of cases 
explicitly held, unfortunately with little serious analysis, that the 1997 Amendments 
had “effectively overruled” Chris L.244
 Several experienced education advocates have creatively analyzed the room 
ostensibly left open in the Chris L. provision of the 1997 amendments to the IDEA.245 
Open areas include: What is “reporting”? What is a “crime”? Who are “appropriate 
authorities”? These advocates have also charted inventive pathways to challenge 
referrals to law enforcement under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the 
Americans with Disabilities Act. Others have shown advocates how to use the IDEA 
for better educational outcomes once a student is enmeshed in juvenile court 
proceedings.246 The rising awareness of these issues should lead to new rules-based 
challenges,247 making the climate for revisiting Chris L.-type legal claims ripe. What 
242. Id.
243. Id. at 725 (concluding that the IDEA does not trump the juvenile court’s jurisdiction when a delinquency 
petition is filed against a child covered by the IDEA).
244. See Joseph M. v. Se. Delco Sch. Dist., No. CIV. A. 99-4645, 2001 WL 283154, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 
2001) (stating that the 1997 amendments made to the statutory language of the IDEA, by plain meaning 
of the statute, overrules Chris L. as the case was decided before the 1997 amendments); see also Nathaniel 
N., 764 N.E.2d at 887. In Joseph M., the student was emotionally disturbed. His IEP recommended that 
he receive a “full-time emotional support placement” outside of the school district. The district took 
disciplinary actions against Joseph M. on at least seven occasions, including filing reports with the 
police department. He ultimately set a small fire in the school cafeteria. This episode led to his 
incarceration. Joseph M., 2001 WL 283154, at *2–3. Nathaniel N. went even further than Joseph M., 
reckoning that Congress had implicitly rejected the reasoning in Chris L., and that a referral to juvenile 
court could not constitute a change in placement. Nathaniel N., 764 N.E.2d at 887. In Nathaniel N., the 
student had a long history of allegedly disruptive behavior. He was the subject of numerous disciplinary 
actions, including directing vulgar language at teachers, disobeying school rules, and failing to report 
for assigned detentions. A psycho-educational evaluation concluded that Nathaniel’s behavior potentially 
warranted placement in a program for students with behavioral and emotional disturbances. He 
ultimately was found with two small packets of marijuana while at school and was prosecuted. Id. at 
885–86.
245. See, e.g., Ordover, supra note 236, at 18–20. 
246. See generally Joseph B. Tulman & Joyce A. McGee, Special Education Advocacy Under the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA): For Children in the Juvenile 
Delinquency System (1998) (detailing best defenses and strategies under special education law, 
including the IDEA). 
247. Based on the information provided by a listserv run by the Council of Parent Attorneys and Advocates 
(“COPAA”)—an organization of attorneys, special education advocates, and parents—there appears to 
be an upswing in the number of lawyers in legal services and other public interest programs devoting 
attention to the problem of criminalization. See generally COPAA, http://www.copaa.org (last visited 
Mar. 8, 2010); see also Dignity in School Campaign, Presenting a Human Rights Framework 
for Schools: A Model Code on Education and Dignity (2009).
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is needed is an encompassing theory that returns the issue to the remedial roots of 
the IDEA. School administrators should restore the use of reasonable discretion to 
fashion nonpunitive consequences for school-based misbehavior for all students.
 Given the history of the litigation of this issue, future challenges will face an 
uphill—but not insurmountable—battle. Cases like Joseph M. and Nathaniel N.,248 
and subsequent opinions by IDEA hearing officers249 have provided the “green light” 
to schools to refer students to police (and juvenile courts) for less and less serious 
offenses. One disturbing opinion held that if school officials subjectively believe that 
a student’s conduct might be characterized as “criminal,” they may report the student 
to the police.250
 This trend prompted a task force of the American Psychological Association to 
criticize an “increase of referrals to the juvenile justice system for infractions that 
were once handled at school”251—an increase disproportionately affecting children 
with disabilities.252 Cases brought under the IDEA are littered with stories of 
inappropriate referrals. A Kentucky student was charged with drug trafficking after 
she was pressured into giving a classmate some of her prescription Adderall.253 Prior 
to the incident, she had pleaded with the school nurse to keep her medication for her 
so that she would not be exposed to such pressures.254 A Minnesota student shoved a 
classmate and an education assistant and threatened a teacher, who called the 
police.255 Although no damage or injuries resulted, he was charged with fifth degree 
248. Joseph M., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2994; Nathaniel N., 764 N.E.2d 883. For a detailed discussion of 
these cases, please see supra note 244.
249. See e.g., Flour Bluff Indep. Sch. Dist., 108 LRP 40201, 40213 (Tex. SEA 2007) (holding that a school 
can report “alleged crimes” even if the “rationality [or] effectiveness” of the practice is questionable); 
Katy Indep. Sch. Dist., 108 LRP 2915 (Tex. SEA 2007) (holding that a school may pursue criminal 
prosecutions for acts related to a child’s disabilities, even for minor criminal offenses) (emphasis added); 
see also Logansport Cmty. Sch. Corp. & Logansport Area Joint Special Serv. Coop., 107 LRP 35429 
(Ind. SEA 2006) (holding that a school may report an alleged crime to police “for purpose[s] of 
documentation,” even if no damages were caused, and even if the school did not intend to press charges 
and no charges were in fact brought).
250. Harwich Pub. Sch., 107 LRP 30521 (Mass. SEA 2007) (holding that school officials were entitled to 
report a student’s animated f lipbook depicting a plane crash to police, even though the student had done 
nothing that could possibly be construed as criminal).
251. Russell Skiba et al., Am. Psychological Ass’n Zero Tolerance Task Force, Are Zero 
Tolerance Policies Effective in the Schools? An Evidentiary Review and Recommendations 
9 (2006), available at http://www.apa.org/pubs/journals/releases/ZTTFReportBODRevisions5-15.pdf 
[hereinafter APA Report].
252. Id. at 6. The report is careful to note that referrals to juvenile courts have increased across the board—
not just for students with disabilities. Id. at 76–77. However, students with disabilities are 
disproportionately represented in the juvenile justice system, and referrals for relatively minor offenses 
are undoubtedly contributing to the overrepresentation. See supra notes 232–34.
253. S.E. v. Grant County Bd. of Educ., 544 F.3d 633, 635–37 (6th Cir. 2008) (IDEA claim dismissed on 
exhaustion grounds).
254. Id. at 635.
255. Shakopee Indep. Sch. Dist., 45 IDELR 171 (Minn. SEA 2005) (holding that the conduct was 
criminal).
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assault and disorderly conduct.256 Similarly, school officials were allowed to call the 
police to report an Alabama student who made a verbal threat to a teacher and used 
profanity in the principal’s office.257 Finally, in an extreme Minnesota case, two 
students were charged with disorderly conduct in an apparent act of retaliation 
against their parents’ complaints that the school should have provided them with an 
IEP.258 The basis of the disorderly conduct charge was tipping off a classmate’s hat 
and tapping his foot during class—charges that the court nonchalantly held were 
supported by “probable cause.”259
 These cases have erased the line between criminal prosecutions and routine 
discipline. Courts have seized on the compromise language of section (k)(6) of the 
IDEA to sanitize the behavior of school officials who report in order to exclude difficult 
children. At the same time, courts have either ignored or eviscerated the limitation on 
a school’s discretion to report, namely that referrals cannot be used to “circumvent” a 
school’s obligations under the IDEA.260 The Trent N. court was blindly optimistic that 
police and prosecutorial discretion and juvenile court supervision would prevent schools 
from referring students under section (k)(6) in an attempt to “end run” around the 
IDEA.261 Thus far, this far-sighted optimism remains in the minority.
 In reality, there are several dynamics at play that must be confronted for the issue 
to be viewed more sympathetically by the courts. First, police and prosecutorial 
discretion has not proven to be a significant check on school referrals. Often, the 
responding police officer will not know that a child has a disability.262 Even armed 
with such knowledge, officers may lack the necessary training or understanding to 
256. Id.
257. Guntersville City Bd. of Educ., 47 IDELR 84 (Al. SEA 2006) (“I’ll kick your ass if you touch me 
again.”). The hearing officer held that the school did not commit a violation of IDEA by reporting the 
conduct even though the outburst was caused by the school’s failure to properly implement the student’s 
IEP. Unfortunately, the police in this situation determined that the student was in violation of his 
probation and arrested him.
258. S.A.S. v. Hibbing Pub. Sch., No. 04-3204JRTRLE, 2005 WL 2230415 (D. Minn. Sept. 13, 2005); see 
also B.L. v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 52 IDELR 42 (E.D. Pa 2009) (IDEA-certified student whose 
behavioral problems included frequent use of derogatory and inappropriate remarks arrested by a state 
trooper at the behest of his principal for cursing a teacher).
259. S.A.S., 2005 WL 2230415, at *3–4.
260. IDEA Regulations Commentary, 64 Fed. Reg. 12,537, 12,630–31 (Mar. 12, 1999); see also supra note 
224 (Senator Harkin’s discussion of the amendments).
261. Trent N., 569 N.W.2d at 724 (“We see no reason to conclude that these authorities will abandon their 
statutory duties to exercise their discretion in a fair and impartial manner, always bearing in mind the 
best interests of the child. And should such discretion be misused, it is always subject to the 
superintending authority of the juvenile court.”).
262. School officials are often reluctant to pass along such information because of a fear that they will violate 
FERPA. For example, a Tennessee school called the police to arrest an autistic child who had kicked and 
bitten teachers when they tried to physically restrain him during an outburst. They did not inform the 
officers of the disability or the child’s aversion to touching because they believed that FERPA prohibited 
sharing that information, even in an emergency. Christina E. Sanchez, Autistic Boy’s Arrest at School Fuels 
Debate on Discipline for Disabled, The Tennessean, Mar. 30, 2009, available at http://www.theautismnews.
com/2009/03/30/autistic=boys-arrest-at-school-fuels-debate-on-discipline-for-disabled/.
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appreciate what the disability means. Second, another factor profoundly influencing 
the aftermath of Chris L. has been the explosive growth of school resource officers.263 
Chris L. certainly was not the stimulus for this development. The prominent school 
shootings of 1997 and Columbine led many communities to place sworn officers in 
the schools to patrol and to handle incidents that school officials refer to them. These 
officers are frequently called on to intervene in behavioral problems exhibited by 
students, especially those with disabilities.264 Although ostensibly independent of 
school officials, anecdotal stories suggest that many of these officers hew to directives 
from school principals and do not serve as independent safeguards on the issue of 
what constitutes a crime.265 Further, juvenile court judges often “encourage referrals” 
because they believe that court supervision (and threatened sanctions) are the only 
hope for “troubled” children.266
 Unfortunately, courts have yet to find a significant obstacle to the exclusion of 
children with disabilities in the IDEA, even where (as in Chris L.) the school’s own 
failures caused the behavior being reported,267 and even where the school’s subjective 
intention was to exclude the child. The following quote from a West Virginia hearing 
officer epitomizes the problem:
Sadly, the school district’s strong desire to criminalize this child with a 
disability is abundantly clear and disturbing. The teacher threw herself into 
the student’s space when he was not hurting anybody, resulting in her being 
kicked and stomped. Before the teacher even reported the April incident to 
her principal, she first excused herself to call the state police to begin the 
juvenile court process . . . . Although the school district’s desire to criminalize 
this student [for behaviors that are a manifestation of his disabilities] is 
263. See generally National Association School Resource Officers (NASRO), http://nasro.mobi/cms/index.
php (last visited Mar. 8, 2010).
264. Id.
265. NYCLU, Safety With Dignity, supra note 2. See Paul J. Hirschfield, Preparing For Prison? The 
Criminalization of School Discipline in the USA, 12 Theoretical Criminology 79, 79 (2008) (“American 
schools increasingly define and manage the problem of student discipline through a prism of crime 
control.”). See generally Sally Engle Merry, The Criminalization of Everyday Life, in Everyday Practices 
and Trouble Cases 14, 15 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 1998) (“The criminalization of everyday life—the 
redefining of customary practices as crimes—takes shape on a rhetorical terrain of threatened violence, 
disorder, and danger on which expanded legal regulation promises dominant groups security and 
control.”).
266. As noted in the APA Report:
 It might be expected that juvenile court judges would discourage school referrals to the 
juvenile justice system practices if for no other reason than concern about increase in 
case loads taxing the limited-resource system of the courts. Yet many judges tolerate 
and even encourage referrals because of their belief that referral is the only way to get 
“help” for troubled youngsters.
 APA Report, supra note 251, at 78.
267. E.g., Guntersville City Bd. of Educ., 47 IDELR at 118. The issue of lack of intent, a prerequisite to 
criminal prosecution, is a defense that deserves more serious consideration in the context of cases such 
as this one.
945
nEW YOrK LaW sChOOL LaW rEViEW VOLUME 54 | 2009/10
unfortunate, . . . the school district and the teacher may pursue such charges 
if they choose to do so.268
iV. rEassEssing
 A. Complexities
 Poverty or public interest lawyers who practice in settings where client crises, 
coupled with limited resources are the norm, often ask: When do we choose to use 
the existing rules to achieve short-term gain and when do we engage with allies on 
more systemic levels? More frequently, the question is, how do we do both? These 
lawyers discuss innovative direct service strategies such as case aggregation, 
institutional targeting, focused priorities, and other methods designed to connect 
casework with broader community struggles. They also consider—or should 
consider—basic transformations in the structure and methods of their practices. As 
difficult as this change is to imagine for many lawyers, it is important for them to 
assess their genuine satisfaction with their current case practices and to engage in 
thought experiments about the evolving models of community lawyers that have 
emerged during the last decade.269 Such change is hard, and the paths toward a more 
strategic practice are strewn with professional and political difficulties. As the Chris 
L. case demonstrates, individual cases—including those not litigated with law reform 
as an express goal—can have long-term legal and political ramifications. Chris L. 
exemplifies how an issue can transform from a case to a cause.270
 Is Chris L. a story of success or failure? Any case that galvanizes lawyers the way 
Chris L. did inevitably has many dimensions. Unpacking those dimensions is a 
polycentric task. Yet to shrink from this type of self-critical analysis robs others both 
of precious history and rare glimpses into the low-visibility work of lawyering. This 
proclivity for self-critique infuses the “steady work” that Gary Bellow urged; it is 
imperative both to engage in and to examine legal work to understand its potential 
for social change.271
268. In re Student with Disability, 108 LRP 45824 (W. Va. SEA 2008) (citation omitted).
269. See, e.g., Penda D. Hair, Louder Than Words: Lawyers, Communities and the Struggle for 
Justice (2001); Sameer M. Ashar, Public Interest Lawyers and Resistance Movements, 95 Cal. L. Rev. 
1879 (2007); Gary Bellow, Steady Work: A Practitioner’s Reflections on Political Lawyering, 31 Harv. 
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 297 (1996); Susan D. Bennett, Little Engines That Could: Community Clients, Their 
Lawyers, and Training in the Arts of Democracy, 2002 Wis. L. Rev. 469 (2002); Matthew Diller, 
Lawyering for Poor Communities in the Twenty-First Century, 25 Fordham Urb. L.J. 673 (1998); Jennifer 
Gordon, We Make the Road by Walking: Immigrant Workers, the Workplace Project, and the Struggle for 
Social Change, 30 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 407 (1995); William H. Simon, The Dark Secret of Progressive 
Lawyering: A Comment on Poverty Law Scholarship in the Post-Modern, Post-Reagan Era, 48 U. Miami L. 
Rev. 1099 (1994); Louise G. Trubek, Critical Lawyering: Toward a New Public Interest Practice, 1 B.U. 
Pub. Int. L. J. 49 (1991); Lucie E. White, Collaborative Lawyering in the Field? On Mapping the Paths 
from Rhetoric to Practice, 1 Clinical L. Rev. 157 (1994).
270. See generally Ann Shalleck, Clinical Contexts: Theory and Practice in Law and Supervision, 21 N.Y.U. Rev. 
L. & Soc. Change 109 (1993–94).
271. See Bellow, supra note 269.
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 On a conventional level, Chris L. glowingly accomplished several goals. First, and 
many practitioners believe foremost, the stated goals of the clients were achieved. Chris 
almost immediately received acceptable educational services, in time the juvenile 
petition was dismissed, and Mike L. was reimbursed for his legal fees. The case also 
served as a vehicle for Mike L. to vindicate his belief that Chris had been treated 
unfairly and to show Chris that he would go to great lengths to support him.
 On a different level, the case had perverse national reverberations, which were not 
anticipated when the case was initiated. The inclusion of section 1415(k)(9)(A) in 1997 
could be viewed as an open door encouraging school systems to prosecute students 
with disabilities, although the section was much more limited. In this sense, the case 
could be viewed as winning the battle but losing the war. This is not an eventuality 
that client-centered lawyers can always anticipate, nor arguably should they.
 B. Contradictions
 Rules, rights, and roles force lawyers to take sides. The IDEA is one of the last 
of the entitlement statutes. It is the zenith of legalization. Yet the decision to litigate 
this case may have narrowed the field of vision.272 Mobilizing the local and statewide 
disability advocacy groups to combat the school systems’ systematic practice of 
criminalizing students might have yielded more permanent results, or at least shaped 
the thinking of school authorities to be more sensitive to the rights of students with 
disabilities.273 However, such a massive undertaking from an individual case simply 
cannot be mounted without a broader alliance of concerned parents, advocacy groups, 
and other sympathetic interests. It is often hard to reconcile a lawyer’s primary 
obligation to an individual client with broader law reform aims.
 In Chris L., the lawyers advocated with passion.274 Using concepts of narrative 
theory, Chris was described as a small, troubled child, neglected by a school system 
272. Minow, supra note 21, at 370 (“Legal analogies become narrow references to precedents, telescoping the 
creative potential of a search for surprising similarities into a limited focus on prior rulings that could 
‘control’ the instant case. As a result, fabricated categories assume the status of immutable reality.”).
273. A major shortcoming of situating legal practices more in the community is the practical reality that 
private practitioners can only recover attorney’s fees if they prevail in litigation. A substantial portion of 
community legal needs are met by solo or small-firm practitioners. These lawyers can ill-afford to spend 
generous time conducting community education or community organizing campaigns. An innovative 
project that endeavored to formulate new models of community practice networks, with support from 
law schools, was the Law School Consortium Project. Law School Consortium Project, http://law.
umaryland.edu/programs/clinic/initiatives/lscp/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2010).
274. Myles Horton, the founder of the Highlander Research and Education Center, a venerable grassroots 
school for social justice advocates, is reputed to have said about lawyers to the effect: “If all you have is 
a hammer, the only thing you see is nails.” See generally Myles Horton & Paulo Freire, We Make 
the Road by Walking: Conversations on Education and Social Change (Brenda Bell et al. 
eds., 1990). For advocacy of a multi-faceted approach to special education lawyering, including 
community organizing and alliance-building, see Stephen A. Rosenbaum, When It’s Not Apparent: Some 
Modest Advice to Parent Advocates for Students with Disabilities, 5 U.C. Davis J. Juv. L. & Pol’y 159, 
185–93 (2001). For advocacy of broad alliance-building in the context of the larger disability rights 
movement, see Michael S. Wald, Comment, Moving Forward, Some Thoughts on Strategies, 21 Berkeley 
J. Emp. & Lab. L. 473, 475 (2000).
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that discriminated against students with disabilities. He faced, the narrative went, a 
dysfunctional and punitive juvenile court system.275 The school system painted the 
same picture, but more grotesquely.276 Was this fair to Chris and other students with 
disabilities?
 Moreover, the claims made by the school system about the deleterious effects of 
the “dual system” of discipline and the unfairness of the application of the anti-
discrimination principle in the context of this case had strong public appeal.277 The 
former argument was designed to divide the regular education community from the 
special education community. Was this an exercise of control and power designed to 
stif le collective dissent and action?278
 The rhetoric was appealing: special education children, such as Chris, were being 
accorded more favorable treatment than non-special education students based on 
differences that are socially constructed.279 The school system proclaimed that 
immunity from discipline and the extra resources accorded students with mental and 
emotional disorders were siphoning money and energy from the education of the 
majority of students.280 To be sure, the contraction of the virtually unconstrained 
disciplinary prerogatives that schools had enjoyed for years before the IDEA caused 
internal anxiety within school systems,281 but studies have concluded that the tensions 
275. See generally Anthony G. Amsterdam & Jerome Bruner, Minding the Law (2nd prtg. 2002) (on 
the use of narrative theory).
276. See Minow, supra note 21, at 36–38 (on labeling); see also Colleen M. Fairbanks, Labels, Literacy, and 
Enabling Learning: Glenn’s Story, 62 Harv. Educ. Rev. 475 (1992).
277. See Kelman & Lester, supra note 57, at 102–11. For criticism of Kelman and Lester’s application of the 
anti-discrimination principle to students with learning disabilities, see Andrew Weis, Jumping to Conclusions 
in “Jumping the Queue,” 51 Stan. L. Rev. 183, 219 (1998) (book review) (“Kelman and Lester’s book is 
f lawed fatally because they have chosen to ignore the perspectives of their own subjects.”).
278. See Dean Hill Rivkin, Lawyering, Power, and Reform: The Legal Campaign to Abolish the Broad Form 
Mineral Deed, 66 Tenn. L. Rev. 467 (1999). See generally James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: 
Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (Yale Univ. Press 2000) (1985).
279. AD/HD is a neuro-biological disorder, considered a chronic illness by the American Medical 
Association’s Council on Scientific Affairs. Larry S. Goldman et al., Diagnosis and Treatment of 
Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder in Children and Adolescents, 279 JAMA 1100, 1105 (1998); 
Karen R. Stern, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Fact Sheet: A Treatment Study of 
Children with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, May 2001, available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/ojjdp/fs200120.pdf (children with AD/HD at higher risk of engaging in delinquent and anti-
social behavior—describing prominent treatment modalities); see also Gerald A. Gioia & Peter K. 
Isquith, New Perspectives on Educating Children with AD/HD: Contributions of the Executive Functions, 5 
J. Health Care L. & Pol’y 124 (2002).
280. For a discussion of the background behind this argument, see Gregory F. Corbitt, Comment, Special 
Education, Equal Protection and Education Finance: Does the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
Violate a General Education Student’s Fundamental Right to Education?, 40 B.C. L. Rev. 633 (1998–99); 
Bruce Meredith & Julie Underwood, Irreconcilable Differences? Defining the Rising Conflict Between 
Regular and Special Education, 24 J.L. & Educ. 195, 196 (1995).
281. See Kelman & Lester, supra note 57, at 102–03; Wade F. Horn & Douglas Tynan, Revamping Special 
Education, 144 Pub. Int. 36, 44–45 (2001) (arguing that students with behavioral disorders who qualify 
for special education become accustomed to a “lower” standard of behavior).
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caused in some school systems by differential discipline procedures have not interfered 
in the orderly management of schools.282
 What about the school system’s story? Why did it decide to draw a line in the 
sand and litigate this case to the end? Were the central office administrators who 
made that decision pressured by principals and teachers who authentically believed 
that the dual standard of discipline was interfering with their ability to educate? Was 
this pressure at least in part animated by a lack of knowledge about behavioral 
disabilities such as AD/HD? How much disability bias was operating?
 Other parties whose views figure into this complex landscape include the juvenile 
judge and his staff. Although the juvenile judge submitted an affidavit to the district 
court on behalf of the schools, it was fairly tepid.283 He did not engage in strong turf 
protection. Otherwise, the original trial date would not have been allowed to pass so 
readily. How chagrined were the judge and his staff at the prospect that the school 
system would be compelled to formulate appropriate consequences for misconduct of 
this sort? Because students with behavioral disorders compose a disproportionately 
high percentage of children prosecuted in juvenile courts, did the judge and his staff 
see the case as a sentinel for lawyers to press more penetrating and time-consuming 
disability-based defenses for juvenile defendants?284 This is an outcome that has 
gained strong momentum in recent years, thanks in part to the attention paid to the 
phenomenon of the “school-to-prison pipeline.”285
V. a nEW EpiLOgUE
 Whatever the answers to these questions, the story is not over.286 With the 
growing recognition of the school-to-prison pipeline, there is an opportunity to 
remake the law that has grown since the Chris L. case. The time for a re-imagined 
analysis is ripe.
 The cramped interpretation of the IDEA, which authorizes schools to refer any 
conduct they believe might fall under some portion of the criminal code, though 
common in practice, should be rethought. The referral provision in section (k)(6), as 
282. See U.S. General Accounting Office, Student Discipline: Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act (2001), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01210.pdf.
283. Juvenile Judge Affidavit, Morgan v. Chris L., 927 F. Supp. 267 (E.D. Tenn. 1994) (No. 3-93-cv-524) 
(on file with author).
284. See generally Kim Brooks et al., Children’s Law Center, Inc., The Special Needs of Youth in 
the Juvenile Justice System: Implications for Effective Practice 79–107 (2001), available at 
http://www.childrenslawky.org/publications/specialneedsofyouth.pdf (discussing competency, waiver of 
rights, and other defenses).
285. See, e.g., supra note 2.
286. See, e.g., Crime Statistics Unit, Tennessee Bureau of Investigation, School Crimes Study: A 
Study of Offenses, Offender, Arrestee and Victim Data Reported To The Tennessee 
Incident Based Reporting System (2009) (documenting 12,379 offenses occurring at Tennessee 
schools in 2008, with the largest category being 3575 simple assaults); Philip J. Cook, Denise C. 
Gottfredson & Chongmin Na, School Crime Control and Prevention, Mar. 25, 2009, available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1368292.
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the Department of Special Education realized, was not inconsistent with prior case 
law.287 Chris L. did not hold that schools could not report crimes to police, and the 
1997 Amendments cannot fairly be said to have responded to the Chris L. case. 
Instead, section (k)(6) responded to an unfounded fear that schools would be unable 
to protect student safety in an emergency because of cumbersome procedural 
requirements, even though no interpretation of the IDEA prior to the 1997 
Amendments would have prohibited schools from calling the police for assistance in 
proper circumstances.288
 The referral provision in section (k)(6) should not be interpreted in a restricted 
manner because that interpretation undermines the entire statutory scheme. The 
IDEA reflects a careful balancing of substantive goals and procedural mechanisms. 
As the Court explained in Honig, the IDEA was intended to remove the “unilateral 
discretion” that had previously been enjoyed by schools in deciding whom to 
exclude.289 Unfortunately, the prevailing interpretation of section (k)(6) allows a 
school to enjoy that same degree of discretion as it enjoyed in the past. This 
interpretation eviscerates the robust behavioral mandates contained in the statute.290 
If a school’s discretion is broad enough to have a child prosecuted for tapping his foot 
in class, then it must be believed that Congress intended to undermine the goals of 
the IDEA with a single, ambiguous sentence—that it has hidden an elephant in a 
mousehole.291 This is an unlikely scenario.
 The only interpretation of section (k)(6) consistent with the IDEA’s structure, 
and coincidentally, consistent with its language, is as a substantive command that 
forbids exclusion except when a child has committed a crime,292 and a procedural 
mechanism through which the substantive command can be enforced. The question, 
then, is how to define a “crime” and how reviewing courts can ensure that schools 
have not “circumvented” their obligations by referring non-crimes.
287. See supra note 2. 
288. This is why the counterpart to section (k)(6) in the Code of Federal Regulations is entitled “Rule of 
Construction.” The provision did not change the IDEA in substance; it merely clarified that the “parade 
of horribles” feared by school systems was not required by the statute. 20 U.S. § 1415(k)(6)(A) (2006). 
289. Honig, 484 U.S. at 323.
290. For example, the IDEA requires the use of positive behavioral interventions and supports for students 
whose behavior impedes the child’s learning or that of others. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(B)(3)(B)(i) (2006). 
The IDEA expressly gives school administrators discretion to consider “unique circumstances on a case-
by-case basis” when considering a change of placement for a child with a disability who violates a code 
of student conduct. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(A).
291. “Congress . . . does not . . . hide elephants in mouse holes.” Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 
457, 468 (2001).
292. In other words, the negative implication of section (k)(6)—that schools may not refer students to the 
police for “non-crimes”—is compelled by the statute. The provision in section (k)(6) must be read 
against the background of Honig, which clearly prohibited schools from excluding children simply 
because they were manifesting their disabilities in ways that violated codes of discipline. See Honig, 484 
U.S. at 324–26. 
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 In lieu of an unambiguous statement from Congress or a helpful administrative 
elaboration,293 the line between “crime” and “circumvention” must be drawn by the 
courts. Congress’s failure to provide clear boundaries does not, however, negate its 
substantive command—that schools may not circumvent their responsibilities by 
reporting non-crimes. Courts must take seriously the difference between crimes and 
non-crimes. It does not seem beyond the capacity of the judicial branch to recognize 
that foot tapping or profanity is, emphatically, not criminal behavior.
 Furthermore, there must be some meaningful review of school referral decisions, 
supported by remedial authority. Where hearing officers and district courts are asked 
to review school referrals (or referrals by their agents)294 that result in juvenile 
prosecutions, they must have the authority to enjoin the school to withdraw those 
293. The Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services (“OSERS”) has taken some abortive steps 
toward such an elaboration, but its guidance remains ambiguous. See Dep’t of Educ. Office of 
Special Educ. & Rehab. Serv., IDEA: Questions and Answers on Discipline Procedures 9 
(2009), available at http://www.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/discipline-q-a.pdf.
 Question B-1: What options are available for school personnel when a student with a 
disability commits a serious crime, such as rape, at school or at a school function?
 Answer: Under most State and local laws, school personnel must report certain crimes 
that occur on school grounds to the appropriate authorities. The IDEA regulations, 
under 34 CFR § 300.535(a), do not prohibit the school or public agency from reporting 
crimes committed by students with disabilities . . . .
 Id. This guidance suggests that “crimes” include only those infractions for which schools are required to 
report under mandatory state reporting laws. However, it can just as easily be read to mean that crimes 
include at least those sorts of infractions, but are not limited to them. It is possible to draw a definition 
of “crime” by reference to state law in three different ways. First, as the OSERS guidance suggests, is by 
reference to the state’s mandatory reporting statutes. For example, in Tennessee, a school is required to 
report to law enforcement a reasonable suspicion that a student has committed: (1) a violation of one of 
several criminal statutes prohibiting possession of drugs or weapons on school grounds, Tenn. Code 
Ann. § 49-6-4209 (2010), or (2) an assault, battery, or vandalism on school property endangering life, 
health, or safety. Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-6-4301 (2010). The latter statute furthermore prohibits 
reporting to police of “any fight not involving the use of a [dangerous] weapon . . . [or] resulting in 
serious personal injury . . . .” The OSERS guidance suggests that these are the “crimes” that may be 
reported under IDEA section 1415(k)(6). Alternatively, it is possible to define “crime” by reference to 
the statutes governing juvenile courts. State statutes will differ, but Tennessee’s are typical; they provide 
for two categories of juvenile offenses. Those categories are: (1) “unruly” or “status” offenses—i.e., those 
that would not be criminal if committed by an adult, including truancy and habitual disobedience; and 
(2) “delinquency” offenses—i.e., those that would be criminal if committed by an adult. Tenn. Code 
Ann. §§ 37-1-102(b)(9), 102(b)(25)(A)(iii) (2010). Defining “crime” by reference to these statutes would 
command the conclusion that schools may not report “unruly” behavior because it is not “criminal.” 
Finally, an argument is possible under Tennessee law that neither delinquency nor unruly offenses are 
reportable as “crimes” unless they may be transferred to the state criminal courts. Tennessee law provides 
that the juvenile courts are intended to “remove from children committing delinquent acts the taint of 
criminality and the consequences of criminal behavior . . . .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-101(a)(2) (2010). 
In other words, offenses in the sole jurisdiction of the juvenile courts are simply not “crimes.” The only 
reportable offenses in Tennessee, therefore, would be those in which the student was over sixteen at the 
time the offense was committed or, if the student was not over sixteen, serious offenses such as rape, 
robbery, or kidnapping. See Tenn Code Ann. § 37-1-103 (2009) (exclusive original jurisdiction of 
juvenile court); Tenn Code Ann. § 37-1-134 (2009) (transfer of cases to criminal court).
294. This might include police, SROs, or prosecutors in a proper case.
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petitions.295 Perhaps more importantly, where the juvenile justice process has been 
independently initiated by police or prosecutors, juvenile court judges should 
subpoena all pertinent records with respect to the disability. The school should also 
be required to conduct a manifestation determination along the same timeline as it 
would have if the student had not been referred.296 That determination should also 
be provided to the court. A key question, then, for the court is whether the school’s 
action or inaction contributed to the behavior. Where the school has contributed, the 
court should exercise its authority to oversee the school’s progress in meeting the 
child’s needs and supervising the child’s progress. Even where the school appears 
innocent, a full understanding of the child’s difficulties may prompt the judge to 
fashion a less conventional remedy.
 Furthermore, recognition of a pattern of referrals may demonstrate a need for 
collaborative programs. A juvenile court judge is peculiarly suited to facilitating 
communication and collaboration among various stakeholders such as school officials, 
police and prosecutors, social workers, guardians ad litem, and others.297 One such 
program, initiated in Clayton County, Georgia, has been remarkably successful.298 
This program, which delineates the respective responsibilities of the schools, the 
police, the juvenile court, and other stakeholders results in a curbing of unbridled 
discretion.299 Under this protocol, school referrals dropped by almost 70% since 2004 
and juvenile detentions resulting from school referrals are down by 95%.300 Similar 
Memoranda of Understanding that concretely specify the roles and responsibilities of 
the relevant actors have also been promoted by the United States Department of 
Justice.301
295. This remedial power, exercised by the Chris L. Court, undoubtedly survived the 1997 amendments.
296. As the court noted in Trent N., “[t]he school’s responsibility under the IDEA . . . does not end when a 
child enters the juvenile justice system. . . . The school’s responsibility to the child is constant.” Trent N., 
569 N.W.2d at 724.
297. Juvenile courts should screen out as many referrals as is warranted based on the understanding that 
federal and state special education laws should be the presumptive vehicles for addressing misconduct by 
students with disabilities. 
298. See The Child Welfare Policy Centers: Promoting Child Welfare & Juvenile Justice Using Evidence-
Based Practices & Strategies, http://www.childwelfarepolicycenters.com/page/page/2260729.htm (last 
visited Mar. 8, 2010).
299. Id.
300. Id. Other promising approaches to reducing school-based conflicts, ones that often lead to criminal 
referrals, are emerging. See, e.g., Jack Daniel, Amy Tillery & Denise Whitehead, Fresno’s Juvenile 
Behavioral Health Court: A Better Way to Serve Youth, 43 Clearinghouse Rev. 43 (2009); Rana 
Sampson, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bullying in Schools: Problem-Oriented Guides For Police 
No. 12 (2009).
301. See Tammy R. Kochel et al., SRO Performance Evaluation: A Guide to Getting Results 43–45 
(2005), available at, http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/files/ric/cdroms/sroperfeval/guidepdfs/tool_1.pdf.
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Vi. COnCLUsiOn
 Chris L. stands as a determined effort by the court system, which rendered the 
string of favorable nonpunitive, disability-centered decisions in the case, to breathe 
life into the meaning of what Congress intended in enacting the IDEA. In the 
tradition of Honig v. Doe, Chris L. represents a pragmatic recognition that the juvenile 
courts are unsuitable forums for handling low-level misbehavior by students. The 
“hegemony” of the juvenile courts302—and the schools that uncritically rely on them 
and the police to enforce school discipline—was shaken by the Chris L. litigation. 
Congress’s intervention in the issue was time-bound and opaque. In today’s climate 
of rethinking the fundamentals of school safety, educational adequacy, and school 
discipline, the Chris L. case should be used as a beacon of reform.303 The path is 
there for the courts and legislatures to follow.304
302. Barry C. Feld, Bad Kids: Race and the Transformation of the Juvenile Court 117 (1999).
303. The tenability of the disability/nondisability paradigm is keenly explored in Stephen A. Rosenbaum, 
Full Sp[]Ed Ahead: Expanding the IDEA Idea to Let All Students Ride the Same Bus, 4 Stan. J.C.R. & 
C.L. 373, 376 (2008). Rosenbaum urges that inclusive educational practices should cover all at-risk 
students, regardless of whether they meet the constructed eligibility requirements of IDEA. This should 
be the modern day lesson of Chris L. 
304. In Tennessee, the Legislature infirmly sought to extend greater protections to students with disabilities 
by allowing school systems to file a juvenile court petition against a student only after conducting a 
manifestation determination that demonstrates that the student’s triggering behavior was not caused by 
a disability. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-10-1304(3)(B) (2009). This section, however, conflicts with 
Chris L., by permitting the filing of petitions for non-crime status offenses, such as truancy, following a 
finding that the behavior was not a manifestation of the student’s disability. See Chris L., 927 F. Supp. 
at 270–71. In the IDEA amendments of 2004, Congress gave school authorities substantial discretion 
to determine on a case-by-case basis whether to order a change of placement for a child with a disability 
who violates a code of student conduct. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(K)(1)(A) (2006). Since Chris L. was 
bottomed on a potential change of placement (to juvenile detention), this section could be used to argue 
that school authorities should exercise the discretion conferred on them by this section before referring 
any student with a disability to law enforcement officers.
